The Journal of
Pastoral Care

VOL. VIII WINTER, 1954 No. 4

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLINICAL TRAINING AND FIELD WORK SUPERVISION

THE REV. CARROLL A. WISE, PH.D.

Professor of Pastoral Psychology and Counseling, Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Illinois

Field work supervision seems to be somewhat in the category of an unsolved problem in theological education. In many respects, we seem to be no further along in the development of this area than we were twenty-five years ago. There are perhaps many reasons for this situation which we need not discuss here. Our attention is rather to be centered on the relation of field work and clinical pastoral training, particularly at the point of what insight clinical pastoral training may throw on the development of field work supervision.

We often identify clinical training with field work. The reason for this is that they are both in "the field," that is, they are outside of the classroom, and they do involve some contact with people in an institutional situation. However, there are such fundamental differences between these two programs in aims, methods, and hence in results that such identification may lead to very false and misleading conclusions. In other words, this identification may prevent us from seeing the uniqueness of each of these areas and from discovering the contribution which clinical pastoral training has to make to our knowledge and understanding of field work.

At the outset, we need to make clear a possible central contrast between field work and clinical pastoral training. This is a contrast which

does not necessarily have to exist, but which in many cases does exist. Clinical pastoral training emphasizes the understanding of persons in terms of both individual dynamics and group relationships. Field work supervision is likely to emphasize how to conduct certain types of activities. The operation of the church as an institution is usually the focal point of field work.

Amplifying this a little further, we shall discuss clinical pastoral training. In this training, the student is in an institution, and there are many things which he has to do and many other things which he must refrain from doing. A great deal of time could be spent in understanding the workings of the institution and its administrative policies and procedures. However, clinical pastoral training does not emphasize this. It places the student in direct, close relationships with persons who are suffering from one of the many infirmities of mankind. The student is asked to study himself in relationship to the patient and also to try to understand what is happening in the life of the patient, why it has happened, and what can be done to remedy the situation. The student thus finds himself as part of a dynamic relationship of which the patient is the other part and realizes that an understanding of the whole situation involves an understanding of each part in their relationship to each other.

Here the student is not asked to do something which he has never done. Every student has had some kind of relationships with other people. Here he is asked to study and to try to understand the kind of relationship which he develops with certain particular patients. No one can tell him what kind of a relationship he should develop at the beginning. He will develop whatever relationship he is capable of developing. Then he will be helped to understand himself and the kind of relationship which he develops. In this way, he will be able to make for himself whatever changes seem desirable in the situation. At the same time he is coming to understand the limitations of the other person in the kind of relationships they are able to establish. However, he sees this limitation in terms of the patient's illness and sees that in order to help the person develop better relationships something must be done at the level of the illness. In all of this, ideas which he has received from lectures, discussions, or reading become alive in terms of a dynamic situation. They become a basic source of insight and growth rather than an abstract principle to be applied.

Now if we are to look at field work as such, we see a somewhat different situation. Here the student is being asked to do some things which he is not yet trained to do. Many of the problems in field work supervision arise out of the fact that the student is placed in the work before he has adequate training for it. Thus, field work supervision often has to aim at overcoming certain fundamental inadequacies that grow out of the situation.

Along with this, the emphasis of the student is on his need to know how to do certain things. His questions are chiefly along the line of techniques. He wants to know how to raise a budget, how to conduct a funeral

or a wedding, what to say to an obstreperous person on the governing board, how to handle a committee situation. His field work supervisor may be interested in the same kind of questions. He may see his task as that of dealing with this kind of question and giving the student directions as to what to do or what not to do. He is likely to have to do this from a long distance, that is, without knowing the actual situation. The supervisor in the seminary is not able to get the kind of intimate knowledge of each of the local situations in which his students work as is the supervisor of clinical training able to know each of the patients with whom the student works within his institution. This is obviously a marked handicap and requires some serious thought if it is to be overcome.

Furthermore, the philosophy which the supervisor holds is of great importance. There is always the difficult choice between telling the student what he, as supervisor, would do and helping the student to discover his own resources in the situation and to use his own imaginative and creative abilities to arrive at some solution.

This contrast may seem disparaging to the field work situation. We do not mean it that way. However, we do believe that, as we think about field work, we need to see the various limitations which are imposed by the inadequacy of the training which the student has had, by the situation in which he finds himself, by the scant knowledge which the supervisor may have of the situation, and by what is often a not-too-well articulated and criticized philosophy of field work supervision.

We shall pursue our thinking a little further by approaching it from the point of view of some of the kinds of questions which students ask from the point of view of field work training and consider the contribution of clinical training to such situations.

One of the common questions which comes to many professors in seminaries, even those who are not directly responsible for field work supervision, is "What do you do in a case like this?" Now what the student wants is a rather direct answer to this problem. He conceives his need to be a quick solution, and thinks that the professor should be able to tell him very briefly what to do, and then he will go out to do it.

The fallacy of this kind of approach, from an educational point of view, should be immediately apparent. It creates a kind of dependent relationship on the part of the student or the professor which blocks the growth of the student. What the student really needs is a method by which to approach his problem and study it. He needs to know how to arrive at an understanding of the basic processes which have created the problem or the situation. He needs to have some stimulus to think about his role as a pastor in the situation. He needs to be able to bring to mind numerous theoretical considerations which may apply to the situation and to think them through in terms of their validity. He needs also to be able to visualize various kinds of approaches which are legitimate for the pastor as dis-

tinguished from approaches which another professional worker might legitimately carry out. In other words, if a real educational value is to arise out of the situation, the supervisor must resist what sometimes is strong temptation to give cut and dried answers.

I believe this is one point where the student who has had clinical training has an advantage over the student who has not. For clinical training in itself has taught him a method of approach to problems. It has given him some conception of the dynamics behind various kinds of human situations. He has been brought face to face with the problem of the role of the pastor in relation to other professional workers and in relation to his own calling. He has been faced with issues where theoretical considerations of a scientific or a religious nature have been discussed and brought to bear on various kinds of concrete situations. All this has taken place in an atmosphere where the major issue has not been that of running an institution but, rather, that of helping people to find help or even salvation. He has seen and experienced some of the dangers of doing harmful things and has learned something about refraining.

We are suggesting, therefore, that clinical training has a definite contribution to make to field work supervision at the point of enabling the student to know how to approach and study a situation, to discover resources within his command, and to bring those resources to bear effectively on a given situation. This involves the emotional and professional maturation of the student.

Of course, not all students today have the opportunity for clinical training. We are therefore going beyond this and suggesting that those responsible for field work supervision in our theological schools should be men who have had a long period of clinical training so that in turn they may be able to adapt the aims and methods of clinical training to the processes of field work supervision. It is our belief that clinical training has a great deal to offer to field work supervision through the clinical training of the supervisor.

We come to another question which is often raised from the point of view of the student in field work. We often hear him complain that courses in theology and in other theoretical disciplines have no value for the actual work in which he is engaged. What he is really saying is that he does not see the relevance of this theoretical material to the actual practical situation. In the minds of many students there is a great gulf fixed between the so-called theoretical and the practical, and this gulf becomes wider as they continue in their ministry so that eventually it becomes an unbridgeable chasm. Part of this situation is a reflection of the chasm which exists in the minds of many of our teachers. On the one hand, there are many teachers of theoretical subjects who have no interest in, and no conception of, the relevance of their material to practical situations except in a vague, general way. On the other hand, there are teachers within the

practical fields who themselves have trouble with the relevance, say, of theology to actual life situations.

Here, again, there may be two approaches. One is to tell the student what the relevance of this particular bit of theoretical material happens to be. Perhaps he can see it, perhaps he can't. Perhaps he can see it intellectually but does not understand its meaning in a profound enough sense to make it of any living value. On the other hand, there is another approach similar to that outlined above. The student needs the kind of help through which he can discover for himself the relation of theological formulations to dynamic life processes. He also needs help through which he may himself discover what we might call the practicality of the theoretical. He needs help to discover that our basic theological formulations are the outgrowth and the formulation of dynamic life experiences. He needs help in understanding the nature of these experiences and in understanding that ideas alone do not create experience. He needs to come to see for himself that he does actually have a theory in any kind of practice in which he engages, that all practice is the expression of some theory. He needs to be able to become aware of his basic presuppositions here and, in making them conscious, to criticize and evaluate them. But this is something which another cannot do for him—he must do it for himself.

It is here again where clinical training may have a value for field work and field work supervision. These values which we have just enumerated are those which are sought in clinical training. The student comes face to face with a patient who may be suffering from a profound sense of guilt. This in itself may bring up in discussion and in the student's thinking all that he knows about either the psychology of guilt or the theology of guilt or both. The whole doctrine of sin and salvation may be focused immediately on this particular patient. In another patient the student may come face to face with a person who is wrestling with some of the deeper problems in relation to God. The student soon discovers that he cannot solve these problems for the patient by simply discussing his own religious views with the patient. He comes to understand that behind the patient's struggles with God there are deep emotional situations which must be brought to light and worked through. However, in the interplay between himself and the patient, he comes to the profound, living nature of theology. He comes to see that the situation involved with this one patient may not necessarily be that involved with other patients. He sees the danger of overgeneralization.

Again, we are suggesting that the student needs the kind of help which has become an integral part of clinical training and one of the goals of clinical training. While clinical training may raise many questions about specific uses of theoretical material in helping people, it certainly stresses in a positive way the need of understanding human experience and of formulating that experience in some way which is communicable to other people. We are going a step beyond field work supervision when we suggest that

professors in courses of a theoretical nature, such as theology, might well profit from a period of clinical training and, in turn, might thereafter be able to bring to their students a deeper sense of the relevance of their material for the actual work of the pastor.

We have been trying to suggest in this paper that clinical training with its unique methods, purposes, and goals has some contributions to make to field work supervision which are rather unique. But these contributions are not to be communicated on the level of ideas, nor are the values of clinical training those which can be communicated through ideas. Clinical training is basically an experience through which a student comes to understand himself and other people and the nature of interpersonal relationships in a much more profound manner. To learn in this area, the student must experience, first; then he must be helped to understand the meaning of his experience. The values of clinical training cannot be taught didactically in any classroom. The seminary which wants to do more effective teaching in the field work department might well consider giving its students a background of one quarter in clinical training.

In the second place, we have been suggesting that the values of clinical training for field work can be communicated in part through the experience of the teacher involved. This is not to say that the teacher who has had clinical training will pass on the values he has received in any verbal fashion. This cannot be done, as we have said above. But the teacher who has experienced clinical training will find it a fruitful source for the development of new approaches and techniques in his own task. Clinical training can become a stimulus for the development of new insights into the possibilities of field work, but only through the teacher who has himself had clinical training.

INTERPERSONAL FACTORS IN MARITAL ADJUSTMENT

EDITH WEIGERT, M.D.

Director of the Washington Psychoanalytic Institute; Director of the Washington School of Psychiatry; Member of the American Psychiatric Association and The Washington Seminar on Religion and Psychiatry

Modern dynamic psychiatry does not look at a human being as a closed and static entity, but rather as existing in a constant flux of development, open to the world and its interpersonal influences, which constantly shape and reshape the constitutional structure. There are the biological needs, the needs for food, sleep, even temperature, sex, security, and affection, as well as spiritual needs. But these needs are not isolated, there is the aim to integrate the individual with the changing environment and the changing interpersonal relations. The goal is optimal mutual gratification of needs. Human beings are interdependent; from infancy to old age no one can take care of his needs all by himself. The give-and-take of interpersonal relations tends toward an equilibrium of optimal need-satisfactions, and when this goal cannot be reached there is frustration, anxiety, or even despair.

Changes in environment or new interpersonal relations set new tasks of mutual adjustment, which are met with hope and fear. The stage for each new adjustment is set by flexibility and stability which an individual has reached in earlier interpersonal relations. Entering into matrimony is a big step into a new, unfamiliar interpersonal setting; it is a challenge. It demands a deep readjustment. While all human beings are more or less adverse to change, there are constitutional differences in the rigidity or flexibility of an individual. The degree of flexibility prognostically favorable to marital adjustment also depends to a large degree on the early development of the individual.

In our culture the decision to marry is made by the partners themselves. This freedom of choice demands a high degree of maturity and responsibility which is not possessed by all candidates for marriage. There is a need for counseling at the time the decision is in the making. The primary task of the counselor at this time, or at any later period of preparation for marriage, is to foster understanding and deepening and broadening of self-

Adapted from an address delivered at the Workshop for clergymen on "Preparation for Marriage"; sponsored by the Clergymen's Advisory Committee, Planned Parenthood League of Montgomery County, in cooperation with other community organizations, on May 25, 1954.

awareness so that the prospective partners may enter into the new situation not driven by blind passion or blind anxieties—not knowing what they are doing. It seems to me desirable that the counselor have three sessions—one with each partner, and one with both of them together. In these sessions it is important to elicit sufficient confidence that each marriage candidate will open up and give a thumbnail sketch of his development. This will enable the counselor to arrive at a diagnosis and prognosis of the marital adjustment. Here it is better that he listens much and talks little. He will not by advice or exhortation principally change the decision, but he can increase the self-awareness of the young people so that they tune down their glorified expectations and recognize their weak points. The mood of marital partners is frequently that of exaggerated hopes. Fairy tales end with the conquest of the bride and movies end with the expectation that the partners who found each other live happily ever after. This cultural pattern reinforces idealistic and perfectionistic expectations. Such expectations receive a severe blow when the first disagreement or quarrel occurs, and the badly prepared couple frequently reacts with disproportionate disappointment, as if they had failed in their aspiration for marital bliss. It definitely seems unwise to reinforce the idealistic expectations by exhortation, and, if the marriage counselor can, with good humor, bring the marital partners down to earth, he can be a great help. In addition, he can point out the weak points in the marital adjustment and encourage the couple to return to him or to turn to other trustworthy help in the future when such difficulties arise.

In order to arrive at a valid diagnosis and prognosis of the prospects of the marital adjustment, the counselor may investigate the following main areas: (1) the relation of the marital partners to their parental families; (2) the preparation for sexual adjustment; (3) acceptance of sexual roles and competition in marriage; and (4) the attitude of both partners toward their offspring.

1. Dynamic psychiatry has pointed out the important influence of early family relations on personality development. Man is distinguished from animals in that he is born in greater helplessness and must acquire in less than two decades all the tools for dealing with the complexities of human culture in order to be successfully integrated with his fellow men. This process of acculturation is often far from successful. In particular, emotional maturation frequently cannot keep pace with physiological growth, and failures in early adaptation lead to various degrees of personality disturbance.

Most important is the early mother-child relation, which provides security and an unspoken capacity to trust, the development of which precedes that of language and rational thought processes. Trust is the matrix of religious experience; it grows with the growing child and encompasses first the family and then wider communities. This fundamental trust is

constantly threatened by the danger signal of anxiety. Every unfamiliar experience, every new step in development, implies danger and elicits defense reactions of flight or fight. No child can be brought up without anxieties. They stimulate concentration of energy and, when the danger is surmounted and the anxiety transcended, there is a rise of confidence in self and in the security-providing parental relationship. But if the mother, or both parents, are unable to provide security and intuitive understanding of what a child at a given moment of his development can or cannot do, can or cannot endure, the original relation of trust is transiently disturbed. The child feels lonely and deserted; he is flooded by anxiety, and, because of the excessive defensive reactions of flight or fight resulting from this anxiety, he becomes distrustful, withdraws into solitary preoccupations, daydreams, or becomes belligerent, rebellious, stubborn, and negativistic.

The failure of parents to provide security and trust increases their own anxieties. They become overprotective or overexacting with the child and intimidate him by imposing too many rules and regulations. They do not trust their rapport with the child. Thus parental anxieties separate the parents from the child; the child's needs are misunderstood and his need for trust goes underground. Needs degenerate into greed. The lonely, overanxious child pesters the parents and antagonizes them. This vicious circle leads to further estrangement. But as long as there is life, there is hope. At any point of the development, the repressed trust may come through and rapport and understanding may be re-established.

Prolonged excessive anxieties in childhood have a deleterious effect on the child's preparedness for interpersonal relations in later life, for the pattern of the original family relation is carried over into all later relations. Excessive anxiety fosters a defensive egocentricity; the child feels surrounded by untrustworthy strangers or enemies and tries to get his own way by bullying and forcing, at first his parents, then siblings and playmates. The greed for power is an unsatisfactory substitute for the repressed trust and remains insatiable because it can never fulfill the original need for trust. Or the child defends himself in his loneliness and helplessness by hypocritical submission, as-if performances of surface adaptation, going through the motions, unspontaneous docility. This kind of obedience is deceptive. A person with this kind of defense seems able to adjust to the most adverse circumstances, but there is secret hope for reward, and, if he does not succeed in manipulating his companions into rewarding his secret demands, rage and anger may break loose and betray the deeper disruptive anxieties.

Let us now return to the marriage candidate. It is important to assess the amount of open or hidden anxieties which interfere with the spontaneity of the young person. Excessive anxiety may keep him dependent on his original family and, since he is overly concerned about parental approval, he does not dare to do his own thinking and conforms to such a degree that his spontaneity is squelched. Such dependency on an adult is never genuine love; hate and distrust are hidden behind a hypocritical submis-

sion, while independence, resourcefulness and ingenuity are repressed. Frequently, an overanxious person approaches matrimony with the wish to find at last an ideal parent, someone he can absolutely rely upon; and the compulsion of dependency often produces an intense infatuation.

The dependence on a parent creates a turmoil of indecision as to whether or not to enter into the marriage relation when the son or daughter feels incapable of breaking away from father or mother or both. Dependence on the parental family sometimes leads to protest reactions of pseudo-independence, in desperate attempts to break away from family by marrying a partner from a completely different background, e.g., a person who adheres to a different religion or a different cultural background. I think of the son of a very demanding mother and a weak father who felt very bitter toward his mother because she had exploited him and scarcely ever allowed him carefree children's play. Though he had had to take care of a younger sister and later had to work in the store, he never earned any gratitude from the parents. He became a sour, dutiful fellow who swallowed his resentments and could never play. When he became engaged it was at the urging of his fiancée for he could not make up his own mind. After marriage, he was a very dutiful husband, anxiously overconscientious, and expected as a reward devoted maternal behavior on the part of his wife. She soon became tired of his constant self-righteous nagging, always insisting on duty, with no cheer and no play. She felt guilty because she could not meet his insatiable demands. The vindictiveness against an anxious ungratifying mother entered into the pattern of the marital relation and embittered both partners.

In another case, a young man in his early thirties, the son of an early widowed mother, had always lived with the mother, who clung to him and expected him to replace the lost husband. He was proud of his indispensability, though he frequently felt imprisoned. His mother was suspicious of his interest in marriageable girls and felt that none was good enough for him. Whenever he became seriously interested, she became anxious and complained of headaches and a stomach ailment, whereupon the son felt guilty. When he did become engaged, the idea of the young couple's setting up separate housekeeping threatened the old lady with desolate loneliness; on the other hand, it was obvious that her possessiveness would bring up disturbing jealousies if they took her into their household. The young man expected liberation through his fiancée; he idealized her into an image of perfection and was very sensitive toward any infantilism in her. Any shortcomings in her threw him into a turmoil of indecision and doubt.

2. The next point to which we want to give attention is the problem of sexual adjustment, a problem of fundamental importance in married life. While the lack of sex education is now relatively infrequent, enlightenment about sexual physiology is not sufficient. A young person may know all the facts, and yet, if the information received in childhood was given in the spirit of contempt and prejudice and remains overshadowed by exces-

sive parental anxieties, the sexual act in his mind may be surrounded with disgust and fear. In spite of accurate sexual information, if there has been a guilt-laden hush-hush policy toward sex at home, the parental guilt may have filled the youngster with fear, dread, and horror. He or she may have made observations about sexual activities of adults and did not dare to speak to anybody about them. Here, again, is the lack of trust and an excessive anxiety which splits sexual experience from tenderness and affection.

The overanxious child is particularly susceptible to sexual excitement. Such excitement is often observed in situations of shame, fear, or pain of physical punishment. The lonely, daydreaming child is also sexually excitable, such excitement filling the gap of lacking tenderness and trust. Thus the greed for lust, as well as the thirst for power, can become a substitute for trust. Anxiety maintains the separation of sexual lust from tenderness and affection, and, since sexual lust in such isolation is an insufficient substitute, it becomes insatiable because it cannot fill the original need.

The lonely and overanxious child often suffers severely under the compulsive urge to masturbate. Terrible agony goes into these inner fights to get away from the habit, which burdens the child with guilt, even though the threats of adults that masturbation is an unforgivable sin have become much less frequent in the present era. If a child grows up with lack of trust, the very loneliness of masturbation makes him feel like an outcast, deserted and unacceptable, since the sexual excitement implies the yearning for the intimacy with a heterosexual partner.

Homosexual contacts are not infrequent in adolescence and are usually accompanied with guilt feelings since they do not fulfill the natural need, are often poisoned by the competition of the youngsters, and carry the stigma of public disapproval. Heterosexual activities may also be accompanied with anxieties and guilt, and when this is so the marital adjustment becomes rather complicated. The overanxious person sees in the heterosexual partner a threatening seducer, an accomplice in sinful activities. He cannot integrate the need for sexual gratification with the need for tenderness and affection. A person who grew up with rigid prejudices against sex becomes frightened if the more liberal partner introduces mouth genital activities into the sexual foreplay for these activities appear pervert and sinful to the more conventional partner, who recoils and withdraws.

I was recently consulted by a man who was deeply distressed by his marital maladjustment. He had grown up on a farm and from childhood had been well informed about sexual activities from observing the animals on the farm. But he felt deeply estranged from his parents. The mother was domineering, the father flew into frequent rages, and there was much strife and disharmony in the family. As a boy, he did not dare talk to anybody about his sexual needs or his masturbation; he felt deeply ashamed and guilty. Sexual activity was to him only an animal function. As an

adult, he had many short-lived affairs, always with women whom he despised, or at least looked down on as inferior beings. When he at last met a woman whom he respected, he married her after a short courtship. But he found himself impotent, and the attraction soon vanished. Sexual excitement and respect, he found out, were irreconcilable for him. His wife was hurt, became frigid, and withdrew. He resumed his promiscuous extra-marital relations without much gratification, because he felt guilty and inferior in relation to his wife. Psychotherapy had to be recommended to him to heal the rift between sexual lust and respectful affection.

3. My third point concerns competition, the battle of the sexes. It goes back again to excessive anxieties and unwholesome defenses against them. The young person who has developed a cruel, forbidding conscience in defense against excessive anxieties frequently has low self-esteem and is doubtful about his fitness in competition, which appears to him as threatening and merciless. The overanxious boy is often called a sissy. This reminds us of Hamlet, who said that his conscience made a coward of him. Withdrawal from competition further lowers the self-confidence of the boy or man who is ridiculed as effeminate. Examinations, public performances in competitive sports, or public speaking throw him into a tailspin of stagefright. He dreams of success and effortless victories, and the discrepancy between his wishes and his real performance weighs heavily upon him. Even if a boy overcompensates by pretending toughness, his doubts of his manliness may accompany him far into adulthood. He approaches marriage with misgivings. Will he be potent in sexual intercourse? Will he be able to satisfy the bride? Will he be able to hold her affection and admiration? Will she not prefer a more masculine competitor? Will he be able to raise a family, make enough money, gain enough prestige and competence? Such a worrier is particularly sensitive to any sign of disappointment on the part of his wife when she becomes tired of encouraging him and backing him up.

Likewise, a girl who distrusts her value as a woman, her capacity to win and hold a male partner, to bear and rear children, may evade such painful doubts by playing the role of the tomboy or by withdrawing into defiant independence. She may set up a life-plan as if she needed no one to depend on. She can take care of herself. In relation to others she is inclined to run the show. She gets into heated competition with her male contemporaries and is more interested in the prestige of conquest than in the depth of a relation. She is afraid of falling in love. When she does, she frequently gets involved with a partner whom she can dominate, but she cannot trust him because he is too weak. He does not succeed in taming the shrew! Her deeply repressed need to trust may break through sooner or later, and much depends on whether or not her partner can help her through such a crisis.

A woman who has developed the attitude which Adler called "masculine protest" sometimes has difficulty in accepting the role of the homemaker

and carrying out the menial duties involved, since these activities do not gratify her excessive need for prestige. I remember a patient, a very intellectually gifted woman lawyer, who told me that whenever a boy kissed her she thought in the back of her mind, "And who will do the dishwashing later?" She was an ardent defender of women's equal rights; she did not look mannish in any way, and was very concerned about her good looks, but, when she married, she managed to make her husband, whom she treated like a big baby, very insecure by her flirtatiousness with other men. Sometimes overcompensation for the disrespect for household work leads to the development of the compulsive housekeeper who establishes such a rigid regime of orderliness and cleanliness that one cannot live comfortably and spontaneously in her home. These are further examples of egocentricity, mentioned earlier.

4. My fourth point is concerned with planning for having children. The healthy basis for having children is the need for expansion, the overflow of vital energies which spring from a basic trust—trust in self and the partner, trust in God, the ground of existence. This trust is as far removed from worries and suspicions as from blind gullability. A young couple may want to wait until they have tested out the stability of their marital adjustment, until they have grown together, gained confidence and maturity, or until they have established a basis of greater economic security. Under such circumstances they may ask for advice about planned parenthood, for the peace of mind of a young couple may be jeopardized if they are plagued by worries about the accidents of unplanned conception and pregnancy. It is important that both partners see eye to eye and are fully aware of their motivation to have a child. A serious rift may be created if one wants a child and the other does not. A child that is unwanted by one or both parents has a bad start in life. He will be frustrated in his need for trust. When the parents feel guilty about their aversion toward the child, their wish to get rid of him, these guilt feelings cannot make up for the genuine feelings of welcome that a child needs if he is to feel accepted and acceptable. Guilt feelings on the part of the parents frequently lead to compensatory overindulgence and overprotectiveness which disturbs the genuine rapport with the child's real needs. The guilty parent does not trust his affection for the child or the child's ability for tender cooperation.

Sometimes a child is ardently desired, but not out of a sense of abundance. Rather, the wish for the child may stem from excessive parental anxieties. There is the pressure of conventionality—the arrival of a child would represent an addition to prestige, to keeping up with the Joneses. The child is wanted to fill an inner emptiness, a dissatisfaction with life. The child is to patch up an unstable marital adjustment. However, the child is seldom able to do this. If self-centered demands are made on the child, the parents are usually disappointed, for the child in his helplessness needs the full devotion of the parents. Actually, he represents an added re-

sponsibility and can gratify only those parents who are really willing to take on this responsibility with a trusting enthusiasm.

I have pointed out mainly the danger zones in the interpersonal relations of marital partners. There is not a person in our culture who is absolutely free from neurotic difficulties. Anxiety is the lot of man, and, in manageable proportions, is a great stimulus for growing strength in the process of maturing. I am convinced that marriage is a wonderful opportunity for development. It creates a togetherness that may melt the crusts of self-centeredness which prevent man from his greatest happiness, i.e., devoting himself to someone and something outside of himself. Marriage is such a close relationship that the partners cannot fool each other; each one senses what is going on in the other, even when he or she cannot put it into words.

The marriage counselor can play an important role in bringing about the understanding and mutual respect necessary to make this close relationship of marriage a successful partnership. Among the specific tasks he can perform are these: (1) He can help tone down exaggerated expectations. Married life cannot be all sweetness and love and the partners should not get discouraged by disagreement or even by outbursts of temper for it is safer to have differences out in the open than to conceal them. Concealment often leads to estrangement. (2) He can help to keep the avenues of communication open, for communication is necessary for mutual understanding and only on the basis of mutual understanding can the partners arrive at compromises, concessions, and ultimate trust. (3) He can encourage the young couple to seek help from a minister or a marriage counselor when difficulties arise in their marital adjustment, rather than to rely on close relatives, who are rarely neutral, and, in taking sides, often intensify the estrangement. He can make it clear that they need not feel ashamed or guilty over their "failure." It is human to fail, not a sign of inferiority, and frequently the more sensitive, emotionally more richly gifted people are more likely to run into an impasse than are the less complicated, more conventionally adjusted personalities. (4) In cases in which more serious difficulties are involved, a referral to a psychiatrist is appropriate, better too early than too late. If the psychiatrist is called in as a last resource it is sometimes too late to help.

PROBLEMS OF AUTHORITY FOR INDIVIDUAL CHRISTIANS: ITS USE AND ABUSE

GOTTHARD BOOTH, M.D.

Associate, Columbia University Seminar on Religion and Health

Authority: Power or Right?

The problem of authority is clearly defined in Webster's dictionary: "power or right to act or command." The first "or" indicates the essence of the problem. Does the individual *power* to act also confer upon the individual a moral *right* to do so? Or does the power to act require some ulterior justification for its actual exercise? The humanist feels that he is his own authority; the Christian, by definition, ought to exercise his power only in accordance with the authority of Christ. But even in restricting our discussion to the problem of the Christian we do not escape the dilemma. He, too, is faced with the responsible choice of his individual way of following Christ. Is he to be guided by his own judgment, or by the authority of a specific Church? We cannot even save ourselves the need of discussing pure humanism by restricting ourselves to Christians. Fromm,[1] one of the most vocal advocates of humanism (p. 76), finds that he himself follows Christ because the "human attitude underlying the thinking (of Jesus)" has "the same core of ideas and norms" as that of other Fromm-styled humanists such as the Prophets, Socrates, Lao-tse, Buddha, Spinoza, and the philosophers of the Enlightenment. In fact, the "core" of ideas is presented in a table of "musts" which are extremely demanding. So, even among humanists, it is not possible to escape from the ambivalence: freedom of the individual versus authority of a law found in a leader.

Individual Attitudes toward the Problem

It must be said that the "problem" is not as universal as this abstract discussion suggests. For example, there is a general tendency to ignore the dilemma: Many people experience themselves as irresistibly moved by historical, social, or religious forces; many others see various possibilities and choose among them according to individual conviction. The extraverts are

---

An address delivered to the Adelynrood Conference on "Theology in Action," 1952.

[1] Erich Fromm: *Man for Himself;* Rinehart, New York, 1947. Fromm has proven for many years one of the most intelligent and best-informed prophets of anthropocentric ethics. When the Adelynrood Conference on "Theology in Action" decided on Authority as the topic for 1952, it was agreed upon that Fromm's views deserved particular attention.

carried by the "wave of the future" toward salvation or perdition, the introverts feel responsible for at least their own future, if not for that of humanity. Most people behave sometimes as introverts, sometimes as extraverts, without knowing that they act inconsistently on a serious spiritual issue.

The basic problem cannot be completely avoided by any human being. Unconsciously, at least, each human being becomes adult as the result of an existential process in which his ego and powers outside his ego confront each other. These powers outside the ego comprise both man's animal nature and his spiritual nature, his id and his superego. As Freud put it: "Man is not only more immoral, but also more moral than he knows." Freud likened the relationship between the ego and the unconscious self to the relationship between rider and horse. He pointed out that the greater physical power is on the side of the horse, and that this makes the relationship a precarious one if the horse becomes strongly affected by hunger, sex, or fear. In line with Freud's later discovery of unconscious morality we may add that the relationship is also precarious when the horse has been rigidly conditioned by early training—for instance, a cavalry horse to military signals. In the case of conflict between earlier conditioning and will of the rider, the horse is likely to disobey the rider. The latter case is closely analogous to the psychology of authority. The ego has conscious concepts of his authority to act in certain ways, but his power to do so is often modified or canceled by the unconscious authority of infantile conditioning. The infantile authority is likely to prove the stronger, particularly because it is unconscious. Thus it often influences us insidiously and prevents us from recognizing the true motives of our actions. There is wide agreement that our motives are influenced by the authorities under which we grew up.

The Development of Authority in the Individual

Clinical research has substantiated in recent years Freud's concepts about the genesis of authority. Spitz and Bender in particular have established it as a fact that the primary requisite is the existence of a loving relationship between infant and mother.[2] Only if the mother, or eventually a mother-substitute, can create a genuine experience of shared existence, is the ground laid for later sharing of social and spiritual values. There is no substitute for this sympathetic quality of love, certainly not conscientious scientific care for the bodily needs of the infant. It seems well established that even under optimal physical conditions infants do not assimilate food

---

[2] Rene Spitz: "The Importance of Mother-Child Relationship during the First Year of Life," Pamphlet of the Washington Society for Mental Hygiene, 408 Seaboard Building, Seattle 1, Wash.; also "Hospitalism," in *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child,* Vol. 1, 1945, 53-74. Lauretta Bender: "Psychopathic Behavior Disorders in Children," in *Encyclopedia of Aberrations,* edited by Podolsky, Philosophical Library, New York; also "There Is no Substitute for Family Life," Pamphlet of the Federal Security Agency, Children's Bureau; from *Child Study,* Spring 1946.

if it is given in a purely mechanical way. That cultural demands are even harder to assimilate goes without saying. There is apparently no chance for the development of our concept of authority in adults who as infants never had the benefit of adequate human relationships. Authority in that case is experienced simply as an external power which acts without the aura of *rightfulness* which is implied in the term.

Fortunately, in most cases the child had enjoyed enough of human love to acquire some inner knowledge of authority. The particular quality of accepted authority then depends on two variables which explain why children, even non-identical twins, of the same parents turn out so differently in their relationship to authority. These two basic variables are: (1) The individualities of each one of the respective parents. They are the prototypes of authority, because they always incorporate values by which their culture functions. According to his or her personality, each of the parents has made some specific values of society his or her main motivation. (2) The original constitution of the infant which modifies its reaction to these first authorities.

Anthropological research has established the fact that human nature can survive under authorities of extremely different types [3]—rigid as well as permissive, aggressive as well as affectionate, individualistic as well as mass-minded, etc. As the existence of national and tribal characters indicates, each culture favors the survival of children who are constitutionally fitted for the psychological climate of the particular society. The effect of parental authority, however, is by no means the sole determinant even in rigid and closely knit societies; there is always some individualization of the attitude which the child adopts toward the parental, and indirectly the cultural, value system. Taking our own culture as an example, we find that one child may react more to the competitive, another more to the conformist attitude of its parents; one child may be more rigid in maintaining the attitude once adopted in infancy regardless of changing circumstances, another child will prove to have been more impressed by opportunistic traits in its parents.

It is important to keep in mind that the original authority figures are formed on the strength of love and sympathy: If there is no love, then there will be no authority; if there is no constitutional aptitude, then the acceptance of authority will be ineffective. For example, a constitutionally unaggressive person will be unable to compete effectively. Such a person, perhaps primarily gifted for an aesthetic receptive existence, may become anxious by his lack of success because he recognizes the competitive demands of our society as valid. If the anxiety is serious enough he may try to anesthetize himself against them by drinking or some other addiction. Such reaction to social failure indicates that such persons recognize the values

---

[3] Gotthard Booth: "Variety in Personality and Its Relation to Health," *Review of Religion,* XIII (1949), 385-412.

which our society worships, but that they cannot live up to them. Before going into pathological reactions to authority the normal situation requires consideration.

The Normal Fear of Authority

Under the influence of the contemporary struggle between democracy and authoritarianism it often is forgotten that all authority is rooted in love. To be oblivious of this fact leads to overemphasis on the sanctions by which individual and collective authority asserts itself against deviants. The humanist is appalled by the savagery with which past and present societies have proceeded against criminals, revolutionaries, and heretics. The image of torture chambers and executioners suggests to him that the average individual accepts authority because he fears for his life, or at least fears legal or social penalties. This seems highly questionable: Antisocial people appear only too willing to risk the supreme penalty in their private war against society. On the other hand, most people seem to be law-abiding even when they have a chance to get away with something, as long as the law is enforced by social standards. The active cruelty of authority is in evidence particularly in societies which are authoritarian without traditional authority. Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia have been ruled with conspicuous cruelty because Hitler and Stalin had revolted against the established authorities of their own cultures. They had to expect, therefore, similar hostility against their own authorities. The history of the Spanish Inquisition suggests that there too the succession of foreign rulers accounted for the particular cruelty.

As far as the individual is concerned, the tendency among psychoanalysts has been to stress the threats of the parents *against* the child. The Oedipus complex has often been taken in an extremely literal way as a murderous struggle for survival between father and son. In a slightly milder version the father threatened the son with castration in order to protect himself against the incestuous desires of his son. There is no doubt in my mind that many neurotics and psychotics have undergone in their childhood very real terrors caused by a cruel exercise of physical power. Even in their cases, however, the traumatic effect was based on the fact that the child had a primary love relationship with the parents and therefore the cruelty implied to the child that it has lost the love of the parent.

In psychoanalytic terms such loss can be called a "symbolic castration," because a penis without a love object is impotent. Only in this sense may castration anxiety and fear of authority be considered the basis of authority. Fortunately, this type of anxiety is not a constantly manifest ingredient of life, as little as we experience fear of hunger and of sexual deprivation part of normal motivation.

Under normal conditions each culture establishes certain patterns of activities and rewards which take care of the need for survival and pro-

creation. Anxiety caused by hunger for food or sex is experienced only when something has gone wrong, when the economic system fails or individual problems prevent lovers from coming together. Similarly, obedience to the values and authorities of a given religion or society is normally an unconscious process regulated by collective tradition and experience. We have taken these patterns in "with our mother's milk," as the saying goes.

The saying implies great insight into what we have learned scientifically about nursing and authority. As mentioned above, in the absence of adequate love the human infant dies of malnutrition in the midst of plenty. In less extreme cases the infant assimilates only the food and the most primitive qualities of human nature. Such a child fails to develop into a fully human member of family and society, although it survives physically. For each growing individual the process of assimilating food is intimately linked with the process of assimilating the meaning of being human. Christian faith expresses this fact twice in connection with its two most profound and most difficult demands: In the Lord's Prayer the need for bread is linked with the need for abandoning all claims on God and man; in the Lord's Supper the eating of bread also expresses participation in the most complete sacrifice of creation—the faith that we cannot be saved by anything we do, but only by what we receive. Anxiety of conscience, just as actual hunger, arises for most people only occasionally as results of disturbances in the course of the normal order of life. They are expressions of human imperfection, and each culture and religion seems to provide methods by which the individual can become reconciled to authority although some cultures are more anxiety-ridden than others.

Pathological Fear of Authority

Pathological degrees of anxiety are different from the occurrence of occasional guilt feelings in the majority of people. Neurotics and psychotics are set apart from society because they have been unable to deal successfully with the values by which the particular society or religion maintains itself. By some particular constellation the infant internalized from the parents a special value which separates it from values shared by the community, either because the conscience of the patient is more severe or because it is alien to the culture. It was observed early in the history of psychoanalysis that the peculiar behavior of neurotics and psychotics represents a private religion. They observe scrupulously certain behavior patterns by which they keep in contact with their individual image of authority and keep away from the temptation to worship the incompatible values of the environment. As long as it is possible for them to keep within this system of their own they are as safe from anxiety as a faithful Christian is in Church.

The nature of these "private religions" may be illustrated from a few clinical examples. For instance, it is typical of the *neurotic* that he de-

pends on loyalty to one specific cultural value to the exclusion of others, e.g., we may find a phobic woman who does not dare to walk the street alone because she cannot admit to her consciousness that she would like to prostitute herself in revolt against the demand of her father to live completely to his ideals and on his support. In American culture homosexuality is a common neurosis for those men who become so impressed by the values of their mothers that they live as if they were women. Another, and quasi-religious, aspect of the homosexual is his avoidance of sexual anxiety by an obsessive sexual preoccupation: It represents phallic worship to compensate for the failure to live sexually according to the law of nature. Generally speaking, the values of the neurotic are closely associated with material forms of behavior such as physical action, digestion, and sex. The schizophrenic depends for his feeling of security on more intangible, symbolic values—the catatonic needs to preserve the image of his own unique individuality, the paranoid needs to feel his oneness with the particular value which he considers most important in the world. This is symbolized by the extreme forms of the two illnesses: The catatonic refuses to accept anything from the outside world—he does not eat and does not move regardless of what normal incentives are offered. The paranoid, on the other hand, gives himself so frantically to an idea, no matter how peculiar, that he may sacrifice his life in following its demands. In both instances the demands of man's animal nature and of his collective superego are repressed. His supreme authority is a special synthesis between his inborn individualism and some trait in a parent figure fitting his idiosyncrasy.

The preceding illustrations show that it is part of human nature to participate in life through the medium of shared values. They are the effective authorities on which the individual depends for his emotional security. They may be identified with persons, institutions, idols, or they may have become so much a part of human nature that most people do not even think about them as an authoritative code, e.g., the taboos on murder and incest. It is self-evident that each authoritative value excludes certain other values: Man cannot serve two masters. In many areas of life nobody gets disturbed by the fact that the accidents of birth and environment limit man's freedom, and that we easily admit about Ralph Rackstraw that: "in spite of all temptations to belong to other nations, he remains an Englishman."

Yet many Western psychiatrists and anthropologists have become very disturbed by the fact that authority in all known cultures restricts the thoughts and actions of its members. Having realized the infinite variety of ways in which human beings can live, they are appalled by the spectacle of the values which people sacrifice under the influence of authority: A nation goosestepping enthusiastically behind a prophet of national grandeur, forgetting their possibilities of a peaceful, productive life; the Hindu widow burning herself on her husband's funeral pyre instead of remarrying or enjoying her children or grandchildren; the Roman Catholics living in

hovels around resplendent churches, etc. The humanist feels that in each case it is fear of losing the support of authority which prevents the follower from using his thinking power to achieve the good way of life as he sees it. The humanistic rationalist identifies the restrictions of thinking with illness as soon as they interfere with the humanistic pattern: "man must develop his power of reason in order to understand himself," he must "develop his powers of love for others as well as for himself," must "achieve the greatest strength—Virtue is self-realization, not obedience" (Fromm, *l.c.*, p. 37). What makes the humanist so confident that through the unimpeded use of his thinking power he can achieve what so many religions have tried in vain?

The origin of this optimism among psychiatrists stems primarily from their professional experiences. They have witnessed often enough the transformation of anxiety-ridden and sterile individuals into happy and creative ones, so they feel that the same method should help everybody who does not live according to the humanistic code. In fact, anybody not living according to it, is therefore presumed to be less happy than he ought to be. The method used by the psychiatrist is certainly liberation of thinking from restrictions. It is, however, a serious error of judgment if one identifies the sick person with the culturally or religiously restricted one. To help a normal person by the same method as a sick one is as logical as giving insulin to a healthy person because it strengthens a diabetic. Freud was the first to recognize that the neurotic is ill not because he represses his incestuous desires, but because the repression does not succeed. His ego, therefore, needs the pathological symptom to defend itself against the culturally unacceptable impulses. The anxiety caused by the breakdown of the cultural repressions gives the physician an opportunity to reconcile the suffering ego with authority. The psychoanalytic process is actually not liberation from all authority, but from an unrealistic childhood authority. Whereas the normal individual develops normally under the guidance of the realistic values mediated by his parents, the neurotic and psychotic become reconciled to reality later in life through the medium of the psychiatrist. Only under the impact of considerable anxiety will the average human being give up the concepts of right and wrong which have been guiding his life since infancy. Even the sick is never so sick that he would share nothing at all with his fellow men. I do not know of any psychiatrist who would try to cure a person who feels no desire to be helped, no matter how "obviously sick" such a person may appear to others.[4] In fact, even physical disabilities must be respected where they are a part of the accepted self-image, e.g., endemic goiter or the tendency to form luxuriant scar tissue.[5] It should be remembered that Freud, despite his personal atheism, was deeply respectful

---

[4] Institutionalization, shock-treatment, and brain surgery are not psychological cures, but means of eliminating those parts of the brain which manifest the psychological pathology. These methods are "fractional euthanasia," as Harry Stack Sullivan pointed out.

[5] Margaret Mead: "The Concept of Culture and the Psychosomatic Approach," *Psychiatry,* X (1947), 37-76.

of the religious and cultural values of his patients. He emphasized that he had been able to help them without disturbing their spiritual values.

So much may be said at this point on the distinction between the physician and the cultural reformer: The former liberates sick people from the fear of authoritative childhood figures which separated them from their fellow men; the reformer wants to liberate normal people from their common cultural loyalties so that they can share the values of the reformer. His conscious motivation is simple enough: If liberation from restricting authority is good for the sick, it ought to be good for everybody, whether he feels restricted or not.

At this point, however, the psychiatrist begins to wonder about the unconscious motivation behind such aggressive altruism. It is an old rule that people usually persecute in others what they repress in themselves. Humanism is directed against conformity and its authoritative imposition on others, supposedly by fear of punishment. This suggests that the humanist is repressing in himself a need to see everybody in his own image, because he had found himself isolated from his fellow men by the experience of being innately different from them in some respects. He has found himself handicapped by this difference and tries to eliminate it for all of mankind whom he sees as being equally restricted. As humanists are human too, they fall into the same aggressiveness as their opponents, trying to impose the pattern "Basic Human Nature" in the place of the "Master Race" or "Communist Society." I have tried elsewhere to clarify the background for such contradictory behavior and refer my readers to "Conditions of Medical Responsibility," page 252 ff.[6]

The Conflict of Factual Authorities

The contemporary confusion about authority has a superficial origin in the fact that people usually identify authority with the persons and institutions which carry it. This leads to the hopeless efforts to combat the bad authorities by trying to remove the carriers and by appeals to the intelligence of the followers. As experience has shown, at least to me, the seat of authority is in the "follower" as much as in the "leader." The "authority" of Hitler came from the majority of the German people, the "stultifying power" of the radio programs is based on their Hooper ratings. This seeming paradox finds its explanation in the nature of authority: Each individual develops a certain value system which stems from the values which the infant found in the parents. The constitution and personal history of the infant accounts for more or less intensive editing of what the child takes over from its parents. Later on, anybody who carries the same value constellation as the parent figure can also have the same effect. In many cases some other person or institution elicits the traumatic effect originating in a parent because it is not compensated by other values the

[6] *Review of Religion,* XIII (1949).

parent carried together with the disturbing one. All values are in essence psychological, dynamic principles, for which Jung uses the term "archetypes." They are inherited like biological types of personality organization, e.g., the epileptic or the paranoid constitution. In fact, it must be remembered that these biological constitutions themselves go with definite attitudes toward psychological values.

Authority is essentially any psychological value which proves itself capable of influencing individual human behavior. The great problem of our present culture is caused by the fact that it contains a great number of heterogeneous and often contradictory authorities which appeal to the individual for acceptance. Their respective claims are only in rare instances subject to proof, no matter how much they may be supported by intellectual reasoning. The decisive criterion for or against will always be our individual faith in one principle or the other. As was pointed out earlier, this faith is partly due to our individual fitness for it. It has been observed by Oberndorf and others that the results of orthodox psychoanalysis do not depend on the skill and experience of the analyst alone, but also on the individuality of the analyst which permits the patient to establish the deeper unconscious communion on which the rational part of therapy rests.[7]

The unconscious communion is identical with a sharing of specific values, of "archetypes," and it is equally troublesome to the rationalist as to the religionist that the existing values cannot be proven by an intellectual process, but that they originate in the evolution of mankind as unpredictably as the cosmos, life, and its untold manifestations.

In an old, stable culture the process of natural selection produces a certain congeniality between the traditional value system and the people who worship it, until a "creative accident" happens which replaces some traditional value by a new one. Western culture, particularly in this country, is a mixture of many value systems and of many constitutional personality types. This explains the uneasy crossing back and forth of members of the same family between various ways of worshipping God or Man, the "master of nature and of himself" (Fromm, p. 23). The complexity of the confused loyalties is even greater than meets the eye. Many members of religious denominations seem to be unconscious humanists, many humanists seem to worship unconsciously a spirit transcending man. I remember a discussion in which Fromm defined his value system and Tillich commented that he had given in fact a very lucid definition of the Second Person of the Trinity.

Use of Authority in the Church

As a psychiatrist I feel skeptical of the terms "use" and "abuse" of authority. They imply that authority is a thing, an object, which can be

[7] C. P. Oberndorf: "Results of Psychoanalytic Therapy," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis,* XXIV (1943), 1-8.

handled autonomously by individual decision. Actually authority presupposes a relationship between human beings. There is authority only to the extent that somebody recognizes the authority of the person or institution. An Anglican priest has no authority to administer the sacraments to a Roman Catholic. As far as the latter is concerned the Anglican would perform an empty gesture. The Anglican has authority only within his Church, because he shares with it the values which constitute it. Inasmuch as a religious faith represents an effective value, it has authority because the priest and the believer act on the strength of it. The more correct expression would be that *the spirit of the faith uses both the "authority" and the "believer" to act their parts.*

The analogon to this type of dynamics is the sexual act. The power to perform the sexual act is the procreative urge which exists in each species and which throughout nature uses the male and female individuals as expendable vehicles. In the case of masturbation even without consciousness of a fantasy partner the psychological analysis indicates that the individual acts under the power of relatedness to the other sex. Unconsciousness of this power results if the partner is not acceptable to the conscious mind. Sexuality as such is the best known power in natural experience which transcends the individual. It has therefore provided much conscious, and even more unconscious, symbolism for religious practice.

There seems to be no psychological problem about the positive use of religious authority. It is the responsibility of the institutions and of the individual Christians to define the functions and symbols through which they communicate with God. Empirically I have often been impressed by the actual power of the spirit behind the institutions and symbols, where I was intellectually unable to see how some ministers and some rituals could be experienced as vehicles of the Divine. But, as Shaw put it: "Ideas make their technique as water makes its channel, and the technician without ideas is as useless as the canal constructor without water, though he may do very skillfully what the Mississippi does very rudely" ("Three Plays for Puritans").

This mundane quotation may serve as a fitting transition to the discussion of abuse of authority. I hope that I made it clear that I consider religious authority as a transcendant power which by definition cannot be abused. The religious element, like the chemical elements, can enter a synthesis only where an affinity exists, and it always maintains its identity.

What is meant by "abuse of religious authority" seems to fall into two different categories: (1) the abuse of position in the Church for non-religious purposes; and (2) the humanistic complaints that religion is a form of authoritarian power which seeks power for its own sake and deprives man of power to achieve his highest perfection.

As to the first point, it seems to me that the religious element is allied in all human beings with non-religious elements. I have been psychiatric

examiner of candidates for the ministry on a rather extensive scale for several years, and I find the task a very painful one in most cases. Rarely have I come across an easy case in which I could say that a man was too sick to serve the Church effectively under any circumstances; in many cases I found a candidate confused about himself and other people, but capable of straightening himself out to the extent that he would function adequately. To function adequately, however, seems to involve always more or less egotistical needs as soon as one asks oneself the question: What else would this person do if he could not enter the ministry? Does he enter the ministry because nowhere else could he satisfy his personal needs, or do his personal needs make him particularly fit to further the needs of the Church? If so, how much harm is he likely to do to his parishioners by the limitations which go with any outstanding character trait? In the questionnaire of the "Report to the Bishop" there is not one personality trait mentioned which could not prove an advantage as well as a limitation to a man's ministry: Rigidity of thinking, authoritarian attitude, illegitimate heterosexual or homosexual experience, aggressiveness, individualistic aloofness or conventionalistic gregariousness. I can only try to be factual about the psychology of each candidate, and to acknowledge that in most cases a scientific answer is not possible regarding the fitness of a candidate for his spiritual authority. As a Christian I have to have faith that the spirit of Christianity accomplishes its ends often in ways which seem rough and strange to the purely rational observer.

The Humanistic Alternative

Humanists have raised again and again the outcry: What right does the Church have to deal so roughly with human beings? Most people have *concrete* experience only of human existence, its needs and anxieties. It seems therefore stupid to subordinate the satisfaction of those needs and the removal of those anxieties to the relationship with a Being nobody ever saw; a Being about Whom even the foremost believers expressed conflicting opinions. Often they disagreed so violently that they could prove them only by the destruction of the lives or at least social existences of their opponents.

The humanist offers to provide for human happiness in a more charitable and more practical way. He claims that human reason contains the necessary means to accomplish this end. This end is described by Fromm as the rational core of all religious messages. He calls it the "true religious attitude" which, he claims, is obscured in all theistic religions by authoritarian debasement of man's innate powers. Humanism demands first of all that "Man must succeed in recognizing the truth in order to be fully human" (p. 76). This aim is served by the psychoanalytic process of distinguishing between true motivation and rationalization. His examples are not pretty: Cruelty, masochistic dependence, vanity, and deceitfulness are masquerading as justice, love, duty, and logical reasoning (p.

77). Fromm does not reveal how such truths are going to provide for the elevation of man, but links the search for truth with a second demand: The attainment of *freedom and independence* (p. 79). This end is served by accepting the incest taboo in its widest sense—to overcome *all* fixations on the parents, particularly on their "criteria of right and wrong." He recognizes that specialized criteria of right or wrong are attached to families, nations, and races and that they prevent the third accomplishment: the universal "brotherhood of man" (p. 82). Fromm implies that this brotherhood would be united by the recognition of right and wrong, but he does not reveal which unified form right and wrong takes in his mind. It is the fundamental weakness of humanism that it has only generalities without specific content. "The ability to be productive, to love and to think" (p. 28) without fear of authority can be devoted to any number of purposes. This lack of definite form becomes evident in the similes used to describe the human individual as a member of the humanity of the future —a "thread in the texture of the universe" (p. 95) a "drop from the ocean . . . as all other drops which are only particularized modes of the same ocean" (p. 97). This fear of attributing any structure to "man's higher self" (p. 28) may be ascribed to the fact that Fromm represses three truths: That life is always encountered in individual forms only, that evolution is a history of new form arising without human planning, and that love is the basis of all productive relatedness.

In spite of Fromm's continuous denunciations of power as the evil in the concept of God, he italicizes the dogmatic assertion that "God is not a symbol of power over man, but of man's own powers" (p. 49). It is concern with power, apparently, which accounts for the peculiar fact that love is never considered as a possible relationship to God, that its role in the acquisition of values from parents is ignored, and that the love of one's fellow men is described always as one-sided action of the enlightened humanist. Yet power never created anything, neither in biology nor in man's spirit. Power can only maintain a stable condition, or it can destroy something existing, but the new has to come from something not produced by physical or intellectual power. Any evolution is a creative event not to be deduced from anything existing prior to it. Fromm warns us that but for the few individuals unafraid of losing touch with the herd "we would still be living in caves" (p. 59). But what about the first molecule unafraid of the herd of other anorganic molecules and daring to become alive? What about the first cells which formed a structured organism? But here we run already into a moral dilemma: What about abasement of the cells of the snake skin which is shed every year? Were they not created equal to the brain cells which survive them?

Certainly the history of religion is not a history of pure love of Christians for each other. Ever so often individuals or groups claimed the authority to impose their own ideas upon their fellow men. There have certainly been many who have been more concerned with God's wrath than

with God's love. As a psychiatrist, I cannot see what good can come from fear; as a Christian I cannot see that fear is an essential part of Christian faith. For about two thousand years Western man has "seen through a glass, darkly" and "has known only in part." Yet this imperfect process has produced much in man which "the herd" has come to love. The contemporary anxiety seems to be more frequent among the non-Christians than among the Christians. In comparison to Christian society the humanistic image of man's destination presents itself as an uncharted sea, full of accidents and with man's intelligence as the only guiding light. The evolution of mankind, as we know it through archeology and through anthropology, has taken place in relationships to man's image of supernatural powers. Humanism has not offered any valid criticism of this process, nor given us a clearer blueprint of good and evil than we had before.

Summary

The problem of authority for the individual Christian appears to be basically determined by his inner image of what Christ taught. As far as he has become able to love this inner image it becomes his authority, as part of himself. He cannot separate his actions from it without anxiety, not because he is scared of punishment by a wrathful God, but because he is afraid of losing the path he has found toward an existence acceptable to his conscious and unconscious mind. Religion is a "careful and scrupulous observation" of this path. This recognition of authority does not seem to be more servile than the recognition of the ways of nature. Although Fromm is confident that "mankind will be able to feed all men . . . (and) not need to pray for daily bread" (p. 104), even he will presumably do this only by careful and scrupulous observation of the conditions of plant and animal life, eventually of the biochemistry of the body.

The authority of the inner image of Christ can be strengthened by the institutions and personal authorities of the Church as they give concrete expression to it through ritual, through individual action, and through teaching. The authority of Christ can become obscured by threatening and hostile attitudes taken by the representatives of the Church, if the individual Christian is divided between Christian and destructive authorities in his own soul. We saw that this happens particularly if the personalities of the parents represented destructive attitudes or the individual has been constitutionally inclined toward aggression.

As the Church has little physical power in our days, the main source of abuse seems to be *misunderstanding* between different personality types. To a very *neurotic* person the concreteness of religious forms will be most essential because his orientation in life is based on physical forms. He will be insensitive, however, to the unconscious meanings of his behavior which may conflict with his conscious intentions. A very *schizoid* person will be most concerned with the inner meaning of religious activities in others and in himself. He will be insensitive to irregularities in the outward forms

of religious practice. It is obvious that a priest of the neurotic type and communicant of the schizoid type will easily misunderstand each other. To use an extreme contrast: A Kierkegaard will deny that there is any valid relationship between Christ and any established Church, the Pope will deny that Kierkegaard could speak for Christ. Either side has, subjectively, authority for his attitude, one the authority of his own understanding, the other the authority of a tradition shared by many. Either side causes anxiety in those of undecided attitude. Is either one using or abusing his authority?

The psychiatrist cannot answer this question. After thinking through the problems he even wonders whether he should have been asked to discuss it. The occasion for this paper was the book by Fromm which denounced all theistic religion as authoritarian and impeding human progress toward happiness. It has often puzzled me why so many Christian Churches have become so sensitive to hedonistic arguments.

By hedonism I mean the concern with those forms of satisfaction which can be verified in a material way. There has been a tendency to identify happiness with the so-called creature comforts of the individual. By a paradoxical development secularism has resulted from puritanism. This in turn has made the Protestant world the most successful civilization we know of with respect to material achievement and power.[8] In the emphasis on the individual all external limitations become causes of resentment. Authority therefore, in particular, becomes suspect because it is seen as one material power pitted against another material power. Fromm makes careful distinctions between rational and irrational authority, but it seems to me very debatable where to draw the line between the two. In essence he treats all power relationships as opportunistic problems as he aspires toward an utopia of complete individual autonomy. Fromm's equalitarianism is seductive to Protestants, because they express in various ways an autonomous relationship between God and man in which either side is endowed with varying proportions of willfulness and power. In humanism and Protestantism authority appears often identified with different degrees of material power, vested in essentially unrelated beings.

Psychological considerations suggested that material power is incidental to authority. The essence of authority was found in the organic polarity between the side which *expresses* authority and the side which *recognizes* authority. I am using the word "polarity" in its original meaning: That a magnetic field is constituted by the lines of power between two poles. No magnetic power exists in an isolated north pole as such, although for historical reasons we put the north pole always on top of our maps. This polarity of all living relatedness was expressed strikingly by Paracelsus: "The man's power is in the woman, the cow's power is in the grass, the

---

[8] Max Weber: *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism;* Scribners, New York, 1930.

power of the hammer is in the anvil." A moment ago I drew a contrast between Kierkegaard and the Roman Church on the one side, Fromm and the Protestant Churches on the other side. I feel that, despite the differences, the former are both closer to the psychological truth about authority, Kierkegaard in his *spiritual* despair, the Roman Church in the extreme emphasis on the *Body* of Christ express the conviction that the polarity of God and man is the inescapable essence of life. If we understand life as relatedness, the material expressions of power assume secondary significance. To conclude with an example taken from my own field of psychosomatic medicine: When a physical part causes trouble we conclude that it has been used in violation of its meaning within the organism, e.g., the asthmatic who relies on exaggerated intake of breath, the obese who makes himself weighty, as a means of self-assurance in facing the basic anxiety of his existence. We try to cure it by finding for each function its proper place, because by purely physical methods we often fail to reach the basic illness, even though we may cure the physical symptoms. Problems of authority in the life of the Christian suggest to the psychologist that the greatest danger of abuse would be an attempt to do something about the material power vested in an organ of authority. The best use of authority will require renewed search for the meaning each organ has in the Body of Christ.

ON THE NATURE OF GIFTS AND GIFT-GIVING

THE REV. CHARLES R. STINNETTE, JR., PH.D.

Canon of Washington Cathedral and Associate Warden of the College of Preachers

Some time ago I had the privilege of baptizing a child in Washington Cathedral. As I approached this young lady of two years, she offered me a gift —a single flower which she carried in her hand. That child's action expressed the profound and renewing mystery of our faith—a gift given in spontaneous trust and affection, which has the power to translate an ordinary experience into the realm of redemption.

It occurs to me that this is the way the Kingdom of God comes, not in striving and busyness, but as an adult receives the unmerited gift of a child's affection. At the very heart of our faith, the mysterious power of gift-giving is encountered. When St. Paul wanted to sum up the never-before-revealed mystery of God, in the gift of Christ, he declared that when Christ ascended on high,

> He led Captivity captive
> And gave gifts to men.

The use of the word *mystery* here conveys more than a secret withheld but the hidden power of God's free gift to man, the consequences of which can neither be anticipated nor controlled. The mystery of God's gift is revealed in the renewing fellowship of those who are able to give and to receive genuine gifts of one another. The Church in *eucharist* becomes "the fellowship of the mystery" where captives to sin and anxiety are moved to give themselves anew in response to the gift of Christ. Who can measure the length and breadth of that gift in Christian history?

But gift-giving in this day has come to mean for many something entirely different. A friend who is a psychologist has been doing some research on this subject, and his findings are rather sobering. He has found, for instance, that gift-giving is actually controlled by group practices and that when, in an office or other collection of people, one is asked to make a contribution, these questions arise immediately: What should I give? What is expected of me? How much is being given by others? My friend concludes that gift-giving appears to be but another expression of social conformity and avoidance of deviation. He admits that there may be such a thing as uncalculated gift-giving but his method of observation has been

unable to measure this factor so far. For a Christian the overwhelming fact is not the minute presence of spontaneous gift-giving—as yet unmeasured—but the weighty accusation contained in the fact that gift-giving in the Christian sense has practically disappeared.

The other side of this dilemma—namely, the capacity to receive a gift —is equally disturbing. Since we have put a price on everything (including ourselves), we are more likely to ask what obligation any gift involves before accepting it. There's something of this wry skepticism in one of the Gospel stories. Faced with the necessity of food for the multitude and the offer, no doubt, of a school boy's lunch, the disciples blurted out: "There is a lad here with five barley loaves and two small fishes." But then more carefully, perhaps not wishing to appear ridiculous, "But what are they among so many?"

What indeed! The apostles were later to learn that any gift, no matter how small, offered and shared in response to God's love is not only made more abundant by the fulfilling of his purpose but the very means by which his grace is poured out in richness beyond human imagination.

Both giving and receiving are at the heart of the Gospel.

Christ gave the gift of relationship when He asked the woman at the well for a drink of water. His gift of healing was there for the asking when another pleaded, "Lord, help me." He gave Himself in the abiding community of faith which knows Him in the breaking of bread.

Giving and receiving establishes a community in which there is the acceptance of mutual trust and dependence. Perhaps this is the deeper reason why we are afraid of gifts: To accept a gift from another is to be drawn into a community based not on mutual comparison but on mutual forbearance in love. We cannot accept or love others because down deep inside we are motivated by the conviction that we are indeed unloveable and unacceptable. The acceptance of the simple truth that God cared enough to give himself for us reveals to us a community of faith the mystery of which is hid from the wise and prudent who busily endeavor to purchase heaven.

It is true that the most important things are given. They cannot be purchased. They cannot be demanded. In these days of frantic efforts to bolster democracy against the communist threat, we need to be reminded, as do those words of Jefferson in his memorial, that a nation which forgets that its freedom is a gift from God will not long endure.

We are called by the name of Christ and he is in the midst of us. Here then are some of the gifts which are ours:

Faith Is a Gift

Faith is the gift of response to God, who cares and who gives himself. Encounter and response are of the very nature of humanity and yet escape

from encounter and token response characterize all our living days. I am saying that we are afraid of each other and, where fear is, anger is also.

One of the most devastating realities of our lives—yours and mine—is the unrelieved loneliness. Those who experience loneliness in mental illness are different from most of us only in degree, not in root cause. They, like most of us, have experienced the hazard involved in every human relationship and as a consequence have withdrawn. Regardless of the technique used to help them, their recovery must always involve a return to relationship—a willingness to risk themselves again in encounter.

Dr. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, one of our great therapists, has done much to demonstrate that even the most seriously ill may be recovered when they are drawn back into mutuality. And that seems to happen only when they respond with a renewal of faith to the gift of genuine relationship on the part of the therapist. Dr. Fromm-Reichmann tells of working with one patient whose withdrawal had taken the radical form of muteness. For months the doctor worked without response from this patient. Then one day her charge blurted out: "I don't know why you keep trying. I'm not interested." Negative as this seems, those words encouraged the doctor and she suggested that they continue on her (the doctor's) faith. A year and a half later, when the patient was really on the road to recovery, she recalled this experience as a turning-point for the patient that the doctor's interest was genuine and given without condition. The patient responded to that gift in faith.

This is what the real community of faith is like. That first man healed at Capernaum was restored even before he took up his bed and walked, in the faith of his friends who let nothing—not even a crowded doorstep—keep them from taking him to the source of help.

> And Jesus seeing their faith said, "Son thy sins are forgiven thee. Take up thy bed and walk."

Hope Is a Gift

It is that conviction that comes, despite the failure of flesh and blood, that there is something in us—something that rests not until it finds its source again in God—which means that we are not left to wither like the grass of the field. Lady Blackwell in T. S. Eliot's play, "The Confidential Clerk," refers to that deeply implanted gift when she says:

> . . . of course, there's something in us, in all of us, which isn't just heredity,
> But something unique, something we have been,
> From all eternity. Something straight from God . . .
> That means that we are nearer to God than to anyone . . .

The great enemies of hope in our day are fatalism on the one side and sentimentalism on the other. Both are ways of fleeing from the encounter with God who knows and searches us—one by denying it, the other by

ignoring its judgment. But that searching and that judgment in the presence of God means, as it eventually did to Job, that God cares. His care is our hope. The psalmist puts it this way:

> My flesh and my heart fainteth
> But God is my strength and my portion forever.

Love Is a Gift

One of the sadest commentaries on modern life is what we have done to the word "love" and its other translation, "charity." An effective motto of one of the benevolent organizations is "Not charity but a chance"—and that strikes a responsive chord in every one of us. But lay beside that use of the word "charity" St. Paul's hymn to love or charity in our Bible: "Love bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things."

Is this the love we know? For many it has become something to be bought—something like a prize for a cheap maneuver. One of the prominent advertisements in the magazines these days has the subtlety and the moral calibre of the snake in Eden: "Would your husband fall for you today?," it slyly asks.

The important thing is that these degenerate uses of the word "love" are there because we put them there. Sadly enough, they are expressions of what is true in our experience. And our experience is the result of all our frantic striving to use love—even love—as a means of manipulation and control of others.

We need the insistent reminder of the words of Christ: "Without me ye can do nothing."

Nothing! Love is not a reward. It is a free gift. It is from God, who is able when we are impotent. Even our virtues will not save us, but love as a free gift can save. We cannot snatch it, or purchase it, or demand it—nor can we generate it from within. But we can have it if we are willing to accept it as a gift. Is not this the deeper meaning of love: It is the gift—the unmerited gift—of genuine relationship?

Every husband and wife must learn this lesson if their love is to endure. Abidingness is built up from freely given love—it is bestowed. I saw it happen again last week on a plane when a mother folded her child to herself and gave him confidence beyond fear and fright.

Freedom Is a Gift

And like every other gift, it must be shared if it is to be preserved. As Christians we know that our freedom is derived from our faith in Christ. The same thinking which prompted Jefferson to remind us that a nation owes its freedom to God should sustain us in this day when we are tempted

to an orgy of fear and security-mindedness. The clear voice of the liberty bell which pealed the joyous note of this nation's birth in language from the Bible should remind us again of the source of our freedom: "Proclaim liberty throughout the land."

The givenness of that liberty is the solid foundation of our life together. Within that mutual trust we have been able to fashion a life based on civil liberties and respect for one another. When anyone for the purpose of cheap political advance plants suspicion and questions the patriotism of a large part of that community, be it the Protestant clergy or the Democratic party, he has taken upon himself the right to undermine the very foundations of our common life. Such men are the enemies of that freedom which we have in Christ and for which our forefathers were willing to die. In a democracy based upon faith in God, every man reveals something of God's Thou to every other man. Where fear and suspicion are deliberately manipulated to displace that trust, freedom has already been destroyed. The great living, throbbing text for these days is: "Stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free."

Faith, hope, love, and freedom—these are gifts from God. They appear in the most unexpected ways—in a faraway manger, in a prisoner's cross, in an empty tomb—yet in abiding presence. Not at all what you would expect from those who manage the success of this world!

Gifts require only acceptance and response. It is as simple as that: "Praise God, from whom all blessings flow!" proclaimed in communion with others who have received the gift.

> The poet puts it this way:
> What life have ye, if ye have not life in community?
> There is no life not lived in community,
> And no community not lived in the praise of God.

The message of the New Testament is that power unto newness of being is given through Christ and within the Church—power to bring strength out of weakness and newness over sin and death. This is the completion of the words and action of God in Christ who, when he ascended on high,

> Led captivity captive
> And gave gifts to men.

The Journal of

Pastoral Care

VOL. VIII WINTER, 1954 No. 4

EDITORIALS

Field Work and Clinical Training

One of the growing concerns in theological education today is the relationship of so-called practical experience to the formal or academic instruction. While field work has been utilized for many years by most seminaries, its primary purpose has been to provide a supplementary income for seminarians. Directors of Field Work, therefore, have been (and still are) functioning as one-man employment agencies.

With the emergence of clinical pastoral training during the past quarter century, a new practical experience has been available. Considerable confusion, however, has arisen as to the nature of these two areas of training —field and clinical. In some cases they have been incorrectly equated. In other cases *any* similarity has been denied or resisted.

Traditionally, field work has, as its name implies, consisted of work in the field, and often with minimal supervision. Ordinarily this work has been carried out during week-ends or even on Sundays only. Sometimes it has been spread across a summer. It incorporates compensation (hence the re-occurring phrase in seminary circles of *compensated* field work), experience, training, and an opportunity to observe the student in a "live" or clinical situation.

Clinical training, on the other hand, has—for seminarians—been predominantly a summer experience. Supervision has been close and highly skilled. Unlike field work, which emphasizes "doing"—i.e., skills, methods, etc.—clinical training has stressed and focused upon "being"—i.e., insights, awareness, etc. The former is *extensive* and the latter is *intensive*.

Actually, however, the two types of experience overlap. In clinical training a theological student also learns certain pastoral methods, and his supervision may be so skilled and intense that it creates an artificial situa-

tion which has little apparent application to the Christian ministry. Likewise in field work there may be fairly close supervision with considerable emphasis upon the impact of the seminarian's personality upon all his relationships.

Whereas many Directors of Field Work are aware and appreciative of clinical pastoral training, and often are envious of the experience and even self-conscious over their not having had it themselves, too few Supervisors of clinical training are aware and appreciative of field work.

In this issue of the *Journal* Professor Carroll Wise offers us helpful and stimulating thinking on these two training resources. He rightly points out how clinical training enables a student to obtain even greater value out of his field work assignment. Our experience certainly bears this out.

We might add, however, that the field work assignment can also contribute to clinical training. For instance, a student's performance and reactions in a given field situation often provide important clues as to the type of clinical training he should receive. Furthermore, the field work assignment also provides a proving ground, a *clinical* situation if you will, wherein a student's clinical pastoral training can be tested.

The *sine qua non* of either type of training is not so much the setting nor the length of the training period but basically it is the *supervision*—its quality, its sensitivity, its maturity, and its relatedness to the man's future vocation.

R.J.F.

A Journal Service

In this issue of *The Journal of Pastoral Care* are to be found abstracts which will be of interest and value to our readers, either because they save us the time otherwise needed to explore so many periodicals and read them through, or because they put us on the trail of things we may prefer to read in full and digest for ourselves. Professor Fletcher has undertaken to collect, write, and edit this department. To that end he exchanges this *Journal* with some twenty others. It is a kind of second review section, except that abstracts are made in the form of reports which aim at summarizing rather than evaluating. However, there is a certain amount of evaluation in the initial act of choosing one paper or article rather than others. For this reason Professor Fletcher is eager to persuade our readers and friends, when they come across something of unusual or special value, to submit a summary for consideration or drop him a line suggesting that he make one. Comments and criticisms of this new service are invited.

E.E.B.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

Edited by The Rev. Rollin J. Fairbanks

Psychotherapy and the Christian Message: Albert C. Outler; Harper, New York, 1954. 286 pp. $3.50.

Using the term "psychotherapy" to cover the general phenomenon of psychological medicine, the intention of the author is to deal with four basic issues in order to illuminate the problems of alliance and conflict between them. The author's belief is that "the Christian world view is not only a possible perspective for the psychotherapy of the future but a more adequate and valid one than any secularist faith can possibly provide" (p. 45). He believes in the *practical* wisdom of psychotherapy but rejects its humanism and naturalism. If the scientific discoveries of psychotherapy depend on its metaphysical assumptions, there can be no fruitful alliance; but if the author is correct in his understanding of the relationship between science and religion, in terms of the history of these two disciplines and of the contemporary scene, the conclusion of the book will be persuasive.

The argument does not depend on the author's grasp of the specific facts of a particular psychotherapist, although there is evidence of wide acquaintance, but on his profound philosophical and theological analysis of the issues involved. He knows what the psychotherapists teach about the nature of man and God. He presents what they have to say about freedom, sin, salvation, and ethics. While many psychotherapists are mentioned, the ones who appear most often are Freud, Fromm, Sullivan, Horney, Jung, and Flugel.

He begins with a list of the fundamental psychotherapeutic motifs: respect for persons, the subpersonal and impersonal matrix of human life and the significance of nature, neurotic behavior is not meaningless, the need for what Sullivan called the "participant observer," the general idea of the psychodynamic process of growth and development, moralism is invalid, much religious thought is projective and delusive, the concept of endopsychic conflict, and the sovereign virtue of love. These motifs have much value for Christian counseling.

Psychotherapy might not have been quite as negative in its evaluation of religion if it had not originated in the environment of secularism. It has not been sufficiently noted that the anti-Christian presuppositions of the Enlightenment led to the specific rejection of the Judeo-Christian tradition by such thinkers as Freud, Fromm, Flugel, Brierly, and Alexander. The scientific revolution led to a *reductive naturalism* in which God is eliminated and human values emerge in an indifferent cosmos. These philosophical concepts were part of the atmosphere and became a chief formative influence in psychotherapy.

One of the foremost early psychoanalysts, James Jackson Putnam of Harvard, saw the need for a philosophical evaluation of basic principles, but he was brushed aside by his colleagues. They did not see, says Outler, that they

were already working on unexamined presuppositions as they espoused secularism and humanism. This has led to an inadequate concept of the self. How can Mullahy and Sullivan, for example, account for the difference between inter*personal* and inter*equine* relations or person-to-*porcine* relations? While the doctrine of the self is often confused in Christian thinking, at least it differentiates man from animal and places him in relationship to God. "To be a self, in Christian terms, is to exist in a unique relation to God." In no other way can there be a full understanding of interpersonal relations, and even Sullivan's interpersonal psychiatry is defective at this point. Outler is not objecting to the clinical findings of Sullivan, for the psychotherapists have shown how the self is involved in every level of existence, "but they leave us still with our basic question unanswered. Why do *human* selves emerge as they do—and with such extraordinary characteristics—in a process which is so nearly similar for many other 'irritable organisms' which nevertheless develop so differently?" (p. 77).

Outler has a genuine appreciation of what psychotherapy can do for men in their sickness and their sin. He sees how its clinical processes contribute to the developing wholeness of personality. Sullivan, in particular, provides insights into the process of growing up which have been made use of by religious educators. The needs that he has demonstrated are now being met through the insights of curriculum writers. But there is still the problem that the adults (parents or teachers) are not themselves adequately mature, and there is the added problem, from the Christian perspective, of the refusal of the psychotherapist to deal with sin. Outler's analysis at this point is deep and practical.

Within a Christian perspective, psychotherapy could be just as scientific as within its secularist context. Christian insights would add new dimensions to the relationship between therapist and patient. There would be a level beyond therapy leading to authentic faith, and this would be seen as beyond the control of the therapist as it takes them both into the presence of God who judges and redeems according to love and justice.

In like manner, psychotherapy has contributed to a deeper knowledge of man's primitive and chaotic urges, of the role of fantasy and pride and wishful thinking, of the weakness of escape panaceas of the "peace of mind" type, and of the neurotic elements of some religious practices. But the religious implications of modern psychiatry lead to the firm conviction that all meanings are found in man himself. Man becomes mature within an impersonal process for a brief span of life ending in death. There are no God and no redemption and no church, for all man needs is psychotherapy. In contrast to these nontheistic presuppositions, Outler provides a magnificent summary of the Christian message (pp. 174-188), and concludes with a statement of the agreements and disagreements between Christianity and psychotherapy.

The same theme is maintained in the field of ethics. Flugel, Fromm, and Sullivan reject moralism and emphasize the rational direction of life and the natural upward thrust toward freedom, love, and self-realization (p. 203). If Christianity is "an ethic without a code" (p. 220), psychotherapy may assist in establishing a religion of faith and grace as against salvation by works. "If it is God's grace which undermines the tyranny of our superego, then we are free indeed!" (p. 237).

Running throughout the book is the Christian evaluation of non-theistic humanism and naturalism. Outler provides a profound analysis and Christian answer to the unquestioned affirmations of faith in secularism and naturalism held by most psychotherapists. His thesis is that this shallow philosophical position is not essential to the true meaning of clinical psychotherapy. So he provides the contrast of a Christian perspective as the basis for an alliance. The disagreements between the humanistic assumptions of psychotherapy and the Christian Gospel are sufficient to "vitiate or undermine a real and honest alliance" (p. 243). In spite of the genuine scientific insights of psychotherapists, and of the similarity of Christian fellowship to interpersonal relations conceived on a human plane, they are radically different. From the Christian point of view, we need to remember that what gets Christians into trouble is that they adapt themselves to a scientific system and *incorporate these insights into the Gospel,* so that when a new scientific insight comes along, they tend to fight it. Therefore, it will not be difficult for Christians to take to themselves the empirically founded practical wisdom of psychotherapy. What is required on the other side is that psychotherapy accept the Christian world view which is the bone and marrow of the Gospel. But as long as psychotherapy lives by Freud's maxim, *"Science is no illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose that we could get anywhere else what it cannot give us,"* there is no hope of an alliance. But, says Outler in a brilliant analogy, "if religious faith reflects an infantile regression, so naturalistic faith looks a good deal like the adolescent rejection of the father, as a precondition to self-assertion" (p. 252).

While there is nothing new about psychotherapy or theology in this book, the combination of the two as a means for a better understanding of both disciplines makes this an indispensable guide to clear thinking in a field highly significant for human relations. Here is the promise of a sounder perspective for clinical procedures and of better understanding of the relation of God's way to the counseling process. The agreements are as important as the disagreements, and both disciplines will gain from this meeting.

The book is heavy going at times, but the clarity of the argument smoothes over the lack of section headings. Psychotherapists might like to discuss the disease that leads publishers to place the notes in the back of a book, for some of the material in the notes is of great interest.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

•

The Leaven of Love: Izette de Forest; Harper, New York, 1954. 206 pp. $3.50.

The crucial point in this remarkable and quite exciting book is that it shows, clinically, how love is not only absolutely necessary as the leaven in all life and living, but that it is especially necessary in the healing work of the therapist. It is a clinical demonstration and exposition, by an experienced psychoanalyst and practitioner, of the pragmatic "workability" of the principle of love (*agape*) in the New Testament, made more emphatic in the gospels as "compassion." The thesis of Sandor Ferenczi running through this book ("the indispensable healing power in the therapeutic gift of love") might be restated in St. John's terms: to live is to love; and what Christians say of God, patients must be able to say of their therapists, "we love because he first loved us."

This orientation in the author's view of counseling will already be known to regular readers of this *Journal,* to which she has contributed two papers (Fall, 1952; Winter, 1948) and several book reviews.

In a lucid style and a stream of almost *intimate* discussion the reader is carried along in a quiet mood of attention and interest, largely due to Mrs. de Forest's own strong convictions, but fully supported by Ferenczi's theory and her own clinical experience, that people are persons. To use Martin Buber's language, she encounters us all as *Thou,* never as *It.* Although Freud doubted Ferenczi's belief that the therapist should be a friend, not just a mirror, Izette de Forest worked under his supervision in Buda-Pest and has ever since lived and healed by that principle, the "leaven of love." Admittedly the dangers in "counter transference" are inherent, but she insists with reason that an analyst determined to cure his patient is bound to care for the patient, and that not to accept this is to falsify reality. Recent work, such as George Rosen's *Direct Therapy,* fully support Mrs. de Forest's opinion that *loving care* (the "unacknowledged element in psychotherapy") is a legitimately contrived positive transference in the treatment relationship.

In other professions, such as teaching, the ministry, clinical psychology, there will be a host of people who can find help and new direction in this book; perhaps the main reason why this is so is that Izette de Forest has an interprofessional spirit, she is irenic as to the valid insights of religion and the humanities, as well as psychiatry's power to heal. One might almost say she is nonprofessional, in the sense that her technical grasp of therapy is too basic and secure to encourage the idea that it is an esoteric trick of some kind.

The wisdom of this book, although attributed with characteristic simplicity or humility to Sandor Ferenczi, is, I feel sure, as much Izette de Forest's as his. This is not by any means to minimize the germinal insight of much he wrote and taught to his pupils in theory, but only to emphasize, as it should be, the creative value and consequences of her own psychoanalytic skills, wedded as they are to an active sense of the worth of persons.

In spite of the empirical principle common to all schools of analysis it is not uncommon to find that works dealing with general theory are often seriously lacking in clinical illustrations. Not only analysts but serious people among the clergy and other non-analytical counselors will be much interested and enlightened by Mrs. de Forest's clinical material, used with a fine sense of frequency and proportion.

Not only pastors among the clergy but also preachers and theologians will be awed and sobered and strengthened to see how psychotherapeutic insights and practice can crystallize and confirm the great Biblical concepts of relationship, alienation, despair, confession, forgiveness, reconciliation, love, and redemption. This is the wheel of faith arising straight up out of the consulting room, valid because it is real; experiential and not merely propositional.

Students of dynamic psychology will be overjoyed to find a book of this modest size and succinct treatment, coupled with an interpretive understanding not too often found in such descriptive essays. Ferenczi has been too shadowy a figure in the growth of analytic theory and practice, in spite of his close and unbroken friendship with Freud.

JOSEPH F. FLETCHER

A Christian View of Sexual Behavior: W. Norman Pittenger; Seabury Press, Greenwich, 1954. 71 pp. $1.50.

During the 1930's a constant stream of anti-fascists from Hitler Germany came to our American shores, many of them brilliant and creative artists, scholars, scientists, craftsmen. We said: "It is an ill wind that blows nobody good." Much the same thing is happening lately as a result of Kinsey's sex studies. We are getting a stream of corrective studies from anti-positivists: Sorokin at Harvard, Hiltner at Chicago. Now comes Dr. Pittenger's little book, like a soft and sensible breeze to clear the air after a heat storm!

From a moral and spiritual point of view, the crucial thing in Kinsey's volumes on the sexual behavior of human males and females is not his collection of facts (which are singularly unstartling, anyway) but his opinion that a sound sex ethic is one that simply approves sexuality in any form of expression it happens to take! To this anti-moral outlook, this "positivist" idea, Dr. Pittenger replies: "Average behavior is not normal behavior." Christian ethics, he might have said, hold that *mores* do not determine morals. Values, such as good and evil, cannot be established by statistics.

Thoughtful Christians, both parents and young people, will find a treasure in this little book, for it appears just when we are beginning to feel a need for a *theology* of sex. Bailey's *Mystery of Love and Marriage* was a good start on it. Moreover, Pittenger's is a constructive theology, not a negative complaint. Kinsey and others (even Freud) tend to lay the greatest premium upon "release" and "outlets" in sexual behavior, the biologic aspect, but *A Christian View of Sexual Behavior* emphasizes its unitive function—the communion or mutual love which it serves when it is taken as a means to the highest end of love and human solidarity. As a theologian, however, Dr. Pittenger makes it quite clear that any false "asceticism" which tries to set the spirit apart from the flesh (as in the puritanical notion that sex is "nasty") is just another form of the Docetic heresy. This was the pseudo-spiritual notion that our Lord was just a spirit, not embodied in the naughty flesh. Against all such attempts to accept the spirit and reject the flesh Dr. Pittenger asserts that a sacramental faith holds the two together, and he goes so far as to claim that "nowhere else in human life do spirit and flesh so clearly meet as in sexuality." This is, as Dorothy Sayers once said, strong meat: it may be too much for the ethical weaklings and refugees from reality.

The down-to-earth quality of Dr. Pittenger's book lies in its modern realism; e.g., the simple statement, "When Freud and others speak of sexuality as central to man's psychology, they are telling the simple truth." Its mystical (really Pauline) quality is reflected in such remarks as Tolstoy's that "Where love is, there God is," and St. Augustine's (speaking of the love of God), "He who is a lover will know what I mean." The heart of the book might be put in a formula of ascent: human reproduction is taken up in sexual love, and sexual love is taken up in the *visio Dei,* or the divine-human relationship. Christian sex, in short, is sacramental because it unites the physical and spiritual, and communion because it unites the partners in love with each other and with God.

JOSEPH F. FLETCHER

Marital Infidelity: Frank S. Caprio, M.D.; Citadel Press, New York, 1953. 272 pp. $3.50.

It is the conviction of the author of this volume that marital infidelity is a symptom rather than the cause of many unhappy marriages in our culture. Even so, as a practicing psychiatrist, the author recognizes his responsibility to help his patients face their problems where they appear.

Beginning with the widespread fact of infidelity and drawing from his own rich experience as a therapist, the writer throws a floodlight on the origins of infidelity while offering sane and practical advice to his readers. In general one might sum up his "working suggestions" in terms of these statements: (1) Fidelity is not instinctual; it is a moral choice. (2) In case of infidelity the marriage partner should keep calm, understand the causes and work for creative adjustment. (3) Confessions of infidelity to a marriage partner may work more havoc than good and should perhaps be made to the pastor or the counselor.

Although Doctor Caprio says that he favors the study of this problem as "behavioral deviation" rather than as a moral question, his advice to patients and his total view of "marital infidelity" as a matter of "disloyalty" illustrates perhaps the difficulty of separating moral judgment from rational discernment. It would seem that the art of therapy has become more important in this case than artificial distinctions.

Perhaps this book belongs beside the cook book and other home aids in every house. It is practical. But does it say enough? Is it adequate to say that all the frightening possibilities of separation and estrangement which issue in "marital infidelity" are to be understood as compulsive reactions to unresolved childhood problems? Or is this but another way of escaping that ultimate encounter in which the real self is laid bare? One can heartily endorse the author's recommendation for calmness and understanding in dealing with infidelity, and still insist that it is an experience, in fact, which reveals the self under judgment and, therefore, calls as much for the grace and mercy of God.

CHARLES R. STINNETTE, JR.

•

Religion, Healing and Health: James Dale Van Buskirk, M.D.; Macmillan, New York, 1953. 153 pp. $2.50.

This is another in the growing list of books that testify to the need for religion in keeping people well, and the place of religious ministration in helping the sick person recover his health. It is simply written, easily read, and bespeaks the author's profound convictions concerning the positive contributions of religion to health.

The chief criticism of this reviewer is the fact that the book promises so much, and delivers so little. Beginning with a foreword which quotes Sadler: "personal religious experience is the highest and truest form of psychotherapy," one is led to expect at least a little of how such ends are to be achieved. Since the author is a medical man of many years' experience, and a clergyman as well, it would be anticipated that he would know how needed such information

is to the pastor concerned about doing his work. Not only is this information not forthcoming (the best the author is able to achieve is to reiterate that such work can be done), but he makes the mistake of writing as though he had provided his readers with the material. It is singularly interesting to find a medical man, with as many years of medical experience as the author has, who leans heavily on other practitioners for his illustrations.

There is little more in this volume than platitudes. The author borrows most of his material from previously published works, and adds nothing new except his own enthusiasm that the clergyman has so much to offer. The fact that the author is medically trained may provide some reinforcement to the feelings of those who are not very certain about the whole field, but it adds no new light in an area where there is much too much darkness still.

ERNEST E. BRUDER

•

Training for Parenthood: Gelolo McHugh; Family Life Publications, Durham, North Carolina, 1947. 227 pp. $3.00.

This is a helpful book intended for people facing the challenges of parenthood from the first possibilities of parenthood through the years of infancy and early childhood. Throughout all of its discussion of the regular questions about feeding, toilet training, sleeping, etc., the author incorporates the findings of current psychology. The essential emphasis of the book is that "preparation for motherhood and fatherhood is . . . not so much a question of training in exact procedures and specialized techniques as it is training in the understanding of child nature."

Though the aim of the book is the development of a warm and loving attitude in the home, the book itself seems to this reviewer to be a bit cold and threatening. This may be because, though the author acknowledges a wide gap between knowing and feeling, the book is written as though knowing produced feeling, and because the "emphasis throughout has been placed on methods of avoiding *errors* that parents *frequently* make." Though a Christian home is implicit throughout the book, the reviewer misses any direct discussion of the religious concerns in training for parenthood. The book can be helpful reading to those for whom it is intended, but it is felt that it will find its most appropriate place in the classroom and discussion group, where warmth and support can come from the group and the group leader.

ROBERT NACE

•

Cell 2455: Death Row: Caryl Chessman; Prentice-Hall, New York, 1954. 361 pp. $3.95.

At this time of writing (late summer, 1954) Chessman is still under sentence of execution in California but managing by various legal maneuvers to stave it off. His "story of my life of crime" has had wide coverage in the newspapers. It is explained in the Author's Note that "to understand the evil of one man is to understand the evil of all men," but this apriorism is, of course, not borne out by the rest of the book. After the first hundred pages its repetitiousness and terrific egocentricity make it increasingly difficult to read. Chessman has

an amazing "gift of gab" enriched by a big vocubulary and a salty use of criminal argot. What blocked and prevented his maturity can be only adduced from his obviously much-tailored memories and posturing attempts at interpretation. It is a strange mixture of logic with illogic, intellectual dishonesty and candor. What is most evident is the author's absurd and unrealistic ego-ideal, as in his bizarre plan to break out of jail and either kill or capture Hitler, to square himself with society.

JOSEPH F. FLETCHER

•

Seduction of the Innocent: Frederic Wertham, M.D.; Rinehart, New York, 1953. 397 pp. $4.00.

There is a growing concern about the influence of so-called comic books. In this presentation Dr. Wertham concentrates upon the violence and particularly the sexual pathology which characterize some of these picture books. He argues that such stimuli encourage and create delinquency and anti-social behavior. In fact he would lead his readers to believe that the comic books are primarily responsible. It is this tendency to over-state the case which weakens the cause. The style is sensational and suspect.

To blame all on comic books is to ignore what dynamic psychology has taught us about motivation. A truly objective study of the role of comics in our contemporary culture is yet to be done.

WILLIAM B. SPOFFORD, JR.

•

Women in the Modern World, Their Education and Their Dilemmas: Mirra Komarovsky; Little, Brown, Boston, 1953. 319 pp. $4.00.

The readability, clarity, and attractive format of this book tempt one to look upon it as just a "popular" book, and not especially profound. Yet Dr. Komarovsky, who is Professor of Sociology at Barnard College, tackles and handles ably one of the most baffling problems of modern society—the problem of the role of women and their preparation for and adjustment to their role. The book is written partially as an answer to Lynn White's *Educating Our Daughters,* which created quite a stir about three years ago.

According to the author the role of women has gone through three stages of development. First was the traditional one of woman as homemaker and childbearer, which was the only role open to women until recent generations. Then came the feminist movement, with its violent manifestations such as the suffrage fight, and its quieter but more far-reaching emphasis on the vocational and educational rights of women. In recent years she sees the growth of an anti-feminist movement, exemplified by such writers as Lynn White.

The anti-feminists, using modern psychological and sociological terms about the "special function of women in society," are particularly critical of higher education for women. They can cite studies of women college graduates who bemoan the fact that their education in no practical way prepared them for the lives they must live as homemakers and mothers.

This might be only an intellectual disagreement among college administrators were it not for at least two facts of the present time, in the opinion of this reviewer. These facts are the widespread concern over juvenile delinquency and the possibility of an economic recession and consequent unemployment. In periods of low employment, there always emerges a group which cries for women to go back to the home. Modern anti-feminism will provide such a group with powerful new ammunition, and so create even worse problems for the millions of women in our society who are of necessity the breadwinners not only for themselves, but for several dependents as well. Many shallow thinkers about the subject of juvenile delinquency are looking for some single cause of trouble, which can then be eliminated. The working mother is an easy target. And again, already overburdened women will have new tensions to face, and, even worse, attention may well be diverted from the many other, and perhaps more grave, causes of delinquency.

Hence, right at this time, it behooves all of us to think clearly on the role of modern women. Dr. Komarovsky charts a wise and reasonable middle course. She is no feminist, who insists that every woman should have a career outside the home. She admits gladly that homemaking and motherhood will always be the major career for most women, and that they need better preparation for it. However, she is more realistic than the anti-feminists in facing the fact that vast numbers of women will pursue other careers for part or all of their lives, either from choice or from necessity.

Her vivid and well-illustrated chapters on the emotional and practical difficulties faced by women who choose careers as well as marriage, as well as her very original delineation of the problems faced by well-educated modern women who do not work outside the home, are full of helpful insights for clergymen, psychologists, and all who have occasion to counsel with women. The book also throws interesting light on the reasons why many women find little satisfaction in, and give relatively poor service to, voluntary activities, which are so large a part of the life of any church.

Dr. Komarovsky discusses the kinds of courses which might be of real value in preparing modern women for marriage and family life. While she is concerned primarily with college courses, she suggests many ideas which could be helpful in marriage counseling or in church-sponsored courses on these subjects. Especially well done are her arguments as to why such courses are as much or more needed by men than women. Those who, like this reviewer, believe in the worth of a liberal education, will rejoice in Dr. Komarovsky's plea for a wide and well-rounded education for those who, as mothers, will shape the thinking of the next generation.

A basic thesis of the book is that our society is uncertain about the place and role of women. Girls and women are exposed to an atmosphere of competition, striving for leadership, and a feeling that everyone should work and contribute to society. Then, in the important area of their relationship to men, they often discover that they must learn a whole new system of values. The wonder, Dr. Komarovsky seems to imply, is not that there are some confused and neurotic women, but that so many succeed in living reasonably happy and productive lives in the midst of these contradictions.

CYNTHIA C. WEDEL

The Well-Adjusted Personality: Phillip Polatin and Ellen C. Philtine; Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1952. 266 pp. $3.95.

This book was written for the average layman. Not only do the authors intend that the reader should be helped by examining himself in the light of the clinical material presented in the book, but also that he should better understand others with whom he comes in close contact. The authors' chief premise seems to be that many conflicts could be resolved before coming to the attention of psychiatrists. Several areas are indicated in which pastors have been able to give effective assistance. A new and refreshing approach in this book is made by pointing out certain situations in which changes may not be advisable. Indicative of this attitude is Chapter V entitled "Not Everybody Should Marry." The authors are keenly aware of individual differences in capabilities and potential levels of adjustment. They emphasize that much conflict results from trying to force one individual into the pattern of another.

Many authorities are prone to interpret all personality problems in terms of one explanatory concept such as social conditions or parental rejection. This book, in contrast, considers the sources of maladjustments in a realistic manner, stressing no one factor in particular but pointing out how the inevitable stresses and strains of life can cause difficulty. For example, an antidote to the idea that the child must be served at all costs is found in Chapter VII, "Parents Have Rights as Well as Responsibilities." The thesis here is that the happiness of the parents is extremely important in any consideration of the contentment and security of the child. Making undue concessions for the alleged benefit of the child may do more harm than good to everyone, including the child.

The authors, husband and wife, have had many years of experience in psychiatry and mental hygiene work respectively. This is the second book they have written together, and they have succeeded remarkably well in writing in non-technical terms. The book is interesting and practical and has a sound, common-sense approach. It is particularly enriched by the inclusion of excellent clinical illustrations.

HERMAN EICHORN

•

Sex and Religion Today: Edited by Simon Doniger; Association Press, New York, 1953. 238 pp. $3.00.

The editor of this book (who is also editor of *Pastoral Psychology*) has in this symposium brought together into one volume ten separate articles by a variety of authors, dealing with sex and religion today. The contributors are all competent scholars in their own fields and their work in this volume is uniformly of good quality.

Sex is considered in its theological context, and its potentialities for good and for evil are given both fair and realistic treatment. The longest chapter is by Professor Ronald H. Bainton of Yale Divinity School and constitutes an excellent historical survey of the treatment which sex has been accorded by the Christian Church. Professor Bainton, before proceeding to a more

detailed consideration of the varying Christian attitudes and practices, glances at the Jewish background which (as he says) is so largely determinative for the Christian view. He also reviews Greco-Roman ideas and behavior, because Christian positions sometimes emerged in opposition to and sometimes with an appropriation from classical sources. His treatment of the scriptural evidence is conservative and stimulating. Throughout the chapter he traces the occurrence and development of the sacramental, romantic, and companionable attitudes toward marriage, and he makes it clear that there was never any question in Christian history but that sex should be confined to marriage. This article is very well documented, and it alone justifies the purchase of the book.

Professor Reuel L. Howe, in his chapter, "A Pastoral Theology of Sex and Marriage," attempts to trace the scope of the field which any true theology of sex must cover. His comparison of agape and eros is helpful and enables him to "let God be God." Dr. Gotthard Booth has found it difficult in his short article to give anything more than some pointers indicating in which direction we should look if we are to acquire a meaningful understanding of the psychosomatic aspects of love and associated sexual behavior.

With the exception of Professor Bainton's contribution the chapters are aimed not so much at giving a full account of a prescribed topic but rather serve as indicators of the sort of way that Christians should seek to think through the various problems raised. Thus Professor Fletcher gives a very balanced and ethical presentation of the sort of principles which should be found in any adequate moral philosophy of sex, the central feature of such a philosophy being that today sex standards cannot and do not depend upon dread of consequences for their control but rather upon true devotion to our highest ideals as Christians. Thus he says: "The fundamental truth to get straight is that our sex standards in an era of medical technology and urban anonymity depend for the sanction upon devotion rather than dread."

This book throughout breathes balance, sobriety, and devotion and its value lies principally in the fact that it points the way toward today's answer to this perennial problem.

MALCOLM A. JEEVES

•

Not as a Stranger: Morton Thompson; Scribner's, New York, 1954. 696 pp. $5.00.

This is a long and intriguing novel about the practice of Medicine (always capitalized and deified throughout the book!). Lucas Marsh, the product of the union between a worldly, "go-getting" male and a spiritually neurotic female, knew that he wanted to be a doctor from his earliest days of consciousness. Nothing, including conflict with his parents, lack of finances, an unsatisfactory and mercenary marriage, and disillusionment with the ethics of his fellow practitioners, prevents him from following his vocation as a dedicated, and hard-working, town-and-country doctor.

Mr. Thompson (whose last book, *The Cry and the Covenant,* was a satisfactory novelization of the life of Paul Ignace Simmelweis, opponent of puer-

peral fever) has given us here a strong and comprehensive portrait of a man of dedication. Step by step, we are taken through his years of intensive training in the medical school and interneship and through the conflicts, and doubts, which attend the establishment of a true and honest practice. Emerging at the end is a man who knows where he stands and who has won values about the sanctity of life which cannot be torn down by the exigencies of day-by-day living.

The book is recommended to hospital chaplains and to town-and-country parsons who, of necessity, are members of an informal professional team with their local doctors.

WILLIAM B. SPOFFORD, JR.

•

Paths of Loneliness: Margaret Mary Wood; Columbia University Press, New York, 1953. 250 pp. $3.75.

Often the especially valuable and rewarding book is difficult to review for its scope and command of detail defy adequate summary. To say that a rich portion of any book is its bibliography is often to condemn it in the minds of some readers. Nevertheless, Miss Wood's survey of the literature of loneliness and isolation and her effective and useful summaries are the solid bones around which she has moulded her sensitive understanding of the forces which make for loneliness within the accepted group and the paths taken by many to handle its pain.

The psychologist, the sociologist, the anthropologist, among others, have been concerned with the sundering powers of modern western society and the human wreckage it causes. Miss Wood has attempted to synthesize the findings of these three fields, to detect the personal and cultural forces which bring about isolation, to scrutinize the unique forces playing on such groups as the single, the unemployed, the aged, the rebel, the leader, and the authoritarian escapist, and to identify and understand the characteristic modes of response in the individual.

INA MAY GREER

•

Eclipse of God: Martin Buber; Harper, New York, 1952. 192 pp. $2.50.

In this book there are gathered together papers and talks produced by Professor Buber between 1929 and 1951 on the general topic of philosophy and religion. The God of the philosopher and the God of religion are compared and contrasted, and Epicurus, Buddha, Sartre, Heidegger, Herman Cohen—together with Kierkegaard and Pascal—all receive critical appraisal. The central point made throughout the book is the limitation of the I-It relationship and the essentially religious nature of the I-Thou relationship. The author is fully convinced that it is only the love of God that can transform the God of the philosopher into the God of religion and here (as we should expect) he emphasizes the importance of existential experiences.

MALCOLM A. JEEVES

The Development of Negro Religion: Ruby F. Johnston; Philosophical Library, New York, 1954. 202 pp. $3.00.

The author purports to describe the Christian religion as it is found in its institutional life among American Negroes today. A good portion of the book concerns itself with historical background, and that which describes the contemporary scene is largely composed of the author's dreams of what ought to be rather than what actually exists. She recommends the book herself "for clarity, facility of expression and ease of understanding," and then proceeds by means of a chain of quotations and social science jargon to produce something resembling a poorly written and badly organized Master's thesis. Her study is based upon an analysis of Negro church life in a South Carolina rural region and in Boston, Massachusetts. Although she is aware that southern Methodist and Baptist traditions are predominant in both areas, she fails to account adequately for prominent deviations from this norm: e.g., the holiness cults, the Boston West Indians, etc. Her insight into the nature of Christian theology leaves much to be desired. Members of many of her "quiet" (i.e., unemotional) churches would feel rather uncomfortable that she sees a tendency among them to disregard orthodox creeds and to indulge in a pragmatic religion of "action." One recognizes throughout the sincerity of the author in her concern that religion be a leavening influence in society. She has drawn upon good books and has had constructive interviews. There is hardly enough here, however, to make the reading of her book profitable for student or pastor.

JOHN M. BURGESS

•

Enriching the Years: Annual Report of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging; State Senator Thomas C. Desmond, Chairman, 94 Broadway, Newburgh, N. Y., 1953. 199 pp. Free upon request.

This, as well as the preceding reports of this Committee, is a mine of information. It is specific, detailed, practical, and richly illustrated by case histories, photographs, and tables. It contains a copy of a resource guide for "senior citizens," reports on the programs in Florida and California for older people, articles on health and the treatment of illness, housing, and the employment of older workers. In addition, of course, it contains recommendations for action, and a report of progress made by New York State in meeting the needs of its older people.

PAUL B. MAVES

•

Science and Religion: Charles E. Raven; Cambridge University Press, New York, 1953. 224 pp. $4.00.

This is the first of two series of lectures in which the well-known English theologian seeks to re-write the history of science from a Christian point of view. In so doing Canon Raven rejects those commonly held assumptions which precipitated the mechanistic and deterministic views which characterized much of the serious thinking during the nineteenth century. What the author

offers instead is a clarification of the religious attitude toward nature as well as a critical examination of the purpose and achievements of science.

ROLLIN J. FAIRBANKS

•

Strength for Struggle, Christian Social Witness in the Crucible of Our Times: William Howard Melish; The Bromwell Press, New York, 1953. 248 pp. $2.75.

Dr. Melish, minister of the Church of the Holy Trinity in Brooklyn, presents a plea for the need to recognize the threat to our civil rights. The book is based on the famous "Melish case," in which the author adequately defended his freedom of conscience and the pulpit.

The book is not, however, a study of the "Melish case," as the jacket represents it to be. Of the 248 pages, less than 40 are actual narrative. The balance are sermons indirectly related to the scattered pages of narrative (printed in bold print at the end of chapters). Of the narrative itself, less than ten pages deal with the "Melish case." The remaining deal with connected problems, ranging from juvenile delinquency to opinions on McCarthy and the Attorney-General's subversive list.

The sermons have no strong relation to each other. The presentation of the author's predicament is disconnected (not until page 68 do we learn how the conflict began), and one must weave his way in and out of Episcopal canon law. The book as a whole, however, presents interesting insight into the thinking of a unusual man.

J. FRANK SCHULMAN

•

The Life of the Soul: Samuel H. Miller; Harper, New York, 1951. 158 pp. $2.00.

One of the reasons why it is difficult to define the soul is because it defies definition. The soul belongs to an order of being where boundaries do not exist. It is possible, however, to talk *about* the soul, and that is what this book proceeds to do.

The author shows (and sometimes with phrases that are for one's notebook) that the soul can learn, and grow, and judge, and take initiative, and change its very course, and express itself in most dynamic fashion. It can choose beliefs, practise attitudes, perform acts and respond to the God who is both without and within. The book has to do with such choices, the need for them, the way they may be made and the resulting effects.

The chapters are short and might best be read devotionally and one each day. They speak, first of all, to the lonely pagans in our culture; then to those Christians who are lagging in the line of march; and then to the truly faithful.

The writing has two foci: the individual and Christ. The one is invited to come into the company of the other. The beginning is dissatisfaction, and the end, eternal life begun now. It is a book which ministers will be glad to read, and to have read; and it will go at once onto that uncrowded shelf where books are kept for sincere inquirers.

JOHN DIXON COPP

Cultural Patterns and Technical Change: Edited by Margaret Mead, for the World Federation of Mental Health; UNESCO, Deventer, Holland, 1953. 348 pp. $1.75.

A team of American social scientists has prepared an analysis of the influence of technical changes, especially in production, transport and communication, upon the "backward" cultures of Burma, Greece, the Tiv in Nigeria, Palau in New Guinea, and the Spanish Americans in New Mexico. Agriculture, maternal and child care, public health and education are among the social organizations studied. The purpose is to throw light on the "prophylaxis" of social neurosis and other emotional ills, rather than on their cure after emergence. An exercise in the preventive medicine of social planning, we might say! It is the *mental* health of these peoples in their culture groups which is the focus of attention.

JOSEPH F. FLETCHER

OUR REVIEWERS

Randolph Crump Miller is Professor of Christian Education at Yale Divinity School . . . *Joseph F. Fletcher* is Professor of Christian Ethics at Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Massachusetts . . . *Charles R. Stinnette, Jr.,* is Associate Warden of the College of Preachers, Washington Cathedral, Washington, D. C. . . . *Ernest E. Bruder* is Chief of the Chaplains Branch at Saint Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, D. C. . . . *Robert Nace* is Protestant Chaplain at Saint Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, D. C. . . . *William B. Spofford, Jr.,* is Director of the Western Extension Center of The National Town-Country Church Institute in Payette, Idaho . . . *Cynthia C. Wedel* is a clergyman's wife in Washington, D. C. . . . *Herman Eichorn* is Protestant Chaplain at Napa State Hospital, Imola, California . . . *Malcolm Jeeves* is a psychologist at Harvard University . . . *Ina May Greer* is Research Associate in Psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston . . . *John M. Burgess* is Episcopal Chaplain at Howard University, Washington, D. C. . . . *Paul B. Maves* is Associate Professor of Religious Education at Drew Theological School, Madison, New Jersey . . . *Rollin J. Fairbanks* is Professor of Pastoral Theology at the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge . . . *J. Frank Schulman* is Associate Minister, First Unitarian Church, Worcester, Massachusetts . . . *John Dixon Copp* is Assistant Professor of the Psychology of Religion at Boston University School of Theology.

CURRENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Edited by The Rev. Joseph F. Fletcher

"Pastoral Care and Psychotherapy," by J. H. van den Berg, *The Student World,* World Student Christian Federation, Vol. 47, No. 1, First Quarter, 1954, pp. 72-89.

The author, a psychiatrist and Professor of Pastoral Psychology in the University of Utrecht, Holland, traces psychopathology from Charcot, assigns the beginning of psychotherapy to Freud, and emphasizes our modern concern with "psychic disturbances in normal people" which has made a place for non-psychiatric therapists. Pastoral care (*Seelsorge* or soul-concern) has developed from the practice of proclaiming the Word to individuals rather than the congregation (Hans Asmussen in his *Seelsorge,* 1933), which excludes conversation and reciprocity, to the new conception that pastoral care requires conversation (Thurneysen in his *Die Lehre von der Seelsorge,* 1946), which proceeds by interpersonal experience, communication, ending the take-it-or-leave-it approach. This comes about mainly because people are changed, due to the confusion or polyvalence in an era of change in society and culture. To become a unified (monovalent) adult person in such circumstances, to live by a single-minded faith, is extremely difficult, as Margaret Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa* shows in a contrast with our own civilization. We no longer come of age at puberty, due to culture conflict, and in consequence psychotherapy and pastoral care emerge to meet personal difficulties. We now dig down to *motives* as more important than deeds, since society no longer upholds monovalent standards (for example, prohibition of divorce or of conscientious objection to war). Thus pastoral care follows psychotherapy in individualizing each person's drives and needs, by a process of interpersonal exchange in the counseling relationship which makes certain that *this* person understands the meanings and terms with which *that* person offers him the Word. We place more store now on the implicit announcement of the Word in what we do and what we are, and not so much upon what we asseverate. Both psychotherapy and pastoral care are aimed at genuine communication. The psychotherapist does not bring God's Word into the conversation, but the pastor does. Psychotherapy is for the seriously disturbed, both psychotic and neurotic; the pastor, who learns much from psychotherapy, "should not practice any psychoanalysis, any non-directive therapy, *rêve éveillé* (dream analysis) etc., any of those specific therapies which would make of him a therapist and put an end to his pastoral care."

J.F.

•

"Mental Illness Is Increasing," an editorial by Russell Dicks, *Religion and Health,* August 1954, Vol. 3, No. 7, pp. 3-6.

The National Mental Health Committee tells us that every year 10,000 more patients are admitted to our mental hospitals than are discharged, their num-

ber increases steadily, the cost of their care increases by $50 million a year, their total is over 690,000: the bill is approximately one billion dollars a year. According to the Committee at least half of them are suffering schizophrenia. Obviously we must inform the public on the importance of early treatment, but can the trend to mental and emotional breakdown be checked? Army authorities believe it can be, because only one in four psychiatric casualties in World War I was able to return to active duty, whereas in Korea 70 per cent were back on duty within two weeks and 25 per cent more within about a month. Others believe we have yet to discover adequate means of treatment, but the fact is that funds to pay for necessary research are not available. In the year ending July 1, 1953, the National Institute of Mental Health had $3 million for research while the Department of Agriculture spent $40 million on hoof and mouth disease in cattle, alone. Churchmen are not enough concerned. While health for health's sake is clearly nonsense, since health is not religion's primary task, yet such widespread disease is obviously contrary to God's will. The question is: Can religious people generate enough of the healing stuff of life? Proposals to find a cure for schizophrenia in endocrine research are mistaken. The therapy must be in the area of the emotions and spirit. Schizophrenics need love and communion, and it is religion that gives the requisite love-force. The toll of mental illness will continue until the reservoir of healing created by religion can be tapped. Let research go forward in interpersonal relations.

J.F.

•

"Adjustment and the Discrepancy between the Perceived and Ideal Self," by Bernard Chodorkoff, *Journal of Clinical Psychology,* July, 1954, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 266-268.

A group of 30 male students in introductory psychology at the University of Wisconsin were studied as a check-test of the research opinion in client-centered therapy (C. R. Rogers, in *Psychological Service Bulletin,* 1951, 3, 47-165) that the greater the correspondence between the perceived (self-described) self and ideal self, the more adequate the individual's personal adjustment. Each subject filled out a Biographical Inventory, underwent Rorschach and T.A.T. tests. A week later they were given a Q-Sort of 125 short self-descriptive statements and asked to sort them to fit themselves. Two days later they sorted the same items to describe the personality they would like to be. Rogers' opinion was not upheld by the results. The most poorly adjusted had low correspondence scores, but some well adjusted also had low scores. However, those with the *highest* correspondence scores were among those rated as best adjusted. We must be cautious about taking ego realism as reflecting adjustment. Why we may not do so, if these findings are confirmed by further tests, is a question for further inquiry.

J.F.

•

"Acceptance of Self and Others, and Its Relation to Therapy-Readiness," by William F. Fey, *Journal of Clinical Psychology,* July, 1954, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 269-271.

Data from 60 freshmen medical students at the University of Wisconsin

were gathered to test the opinion that self-acceptance correlates with acceptance of others, e.g., F. Fromm-Reichmann in Patrick Mullalay's *Study of Interpersonal Relations*, 162-191: " . . . one can love others only to the extent that one loves oneself." A questionnaire of 86 items was constructed and a range of five answers allowed for each item, not only to test the supposed correlation but to relate it to readiness for therapy. The results clearly supported the correlation between acceptance of self and acceptance of others. The least readiness for or acceptance of therapy was found among those in whom there was no correlation of self- and other-acceptance. This appears to mean that those who defend themselves by projecting deficiencies upon and disparaging others dare not concede the possibility of profit from therapy, and they might prove difficult subjects if they entered therapy.

J.F.

•

"Psychiatry and Spiritual Healing," by an anonymous English psychiatrist, *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1954, Vol. 194, No. 2, pp. 39-43.

Recently developed physical therapy for mental disorders is strikingly like the sudden and abrupt conversion phenomena of the revivals held by John Wesley. He deliberately employed forceful and traumatic methods, and spoke of the part played by physical factors in spiritual experience. The author since World War II has personally observed violent revivalism in the southern U.S.A., a practice which has disappeared from England where it was started. The convulsion treatments of insulin and electricity for schizophrenia and depression, which have achieved greater success (when started early) than more persuasive and ventilative (counseling) methods, and the success of leucotomy surgery in long-standing illnesses, show the therapeutic effect of shock or, as Wesley said, the benefit of trying to "suspend vital union, interrupt the circulation, and put nature out of its course." Drug abreaction, such as "truth serum," also often works by shock or frenzy. But it is important to support and recondition persons going through such experiences, and psychiatry often lacks what spiritual healing can give in the way of a positive and satisfying way of life to replace old patterns and confusions.

J.F.

•

"Wives of Alcoholics," by Thelma Whalen, in *Inventory*, May, 1954, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 13-17, 31-33, condensed from *Yale Quarterly Journal of Alcohol Studies*.

Wives may be unconsciously a cause or precipitant of alcoholism in their husbands. There are certain types of such women: (1) Suffering Susan, whose need of punishment causes her to choose a husband so troublesome that she will suffer. She is meek, longsuffering, apt to be drab and without outside-the-family contacts; she presents a picture of uncomplaining endurance, finds goodness is this meek and self-effacing role. The central focus of the counselor is to help Susan understand herself and to encourage her self-esteem and self-confidence. (2) Controlling Catherine, whose need is to dominate and manage things to show how ineffectual and inferior men are. The husband tends to become more incapacitated. Unlike Susan, this type openly and indignantly

blames her husband, in order to assure herself of her greater merit. The outlook for counsel here is not good. (3) Wavering Winnie, a balance wheel who always steps in when the husband's sprees bring disaster. If she leaves him or starts a separation, she always relents. She declares his drinking has killed her love for him, but this is not true. Like him, she is blind to the depth and nature of his disease, and always hopes the bouts won't recur. She may seem affectionate, a good mother and housekeeper. But at bottom she is able to give only to those who seem to need her; because she is fearful and insecure she chooses a husband who leans on her and would be unlikely to leave her. Winnie always believes what she wants to believe. Improvement is possible if family breakdown is not too advanced. (4) Punitive Polly, whose relations to her husband follow those of a scolding and indulgent mother to a small boy, a submissive one. She is really a career woman, always competent and successful. Unlike Catherine she does not insist that her husband take care of her, but underneath her feeling is one of anger toward him. Often their marriage can last for years, the children being the chief victims. Counseling is aimed at helping her to reduce her competitive feelings and find satisfaction in motherly and womanly roles. (N.B. These types may, of course, make use of other deficiencies than alcoholism in their husbands, such as ill health or cultural inferiority.)

J.F.

•

"Man without a Conscience," by Robert C. Murphy, Jr., M.D., *Northwest Medicine,* January, 1953, Vol. 52, pp. 27-28.

The old classification "constitutional psychopathic state" gave doctors an excuse for handling patients and offenders as untreatable. In the Army in World War II the CPS was buck-passed and often discharged. But conscientious psychiatrists modified the concept to "psychopathic inferiority." Still the PI was regarded as "the man without a conscience," a recidivist who had no loyalties or ethical standards, a personality born that way rather than twisted into it. Gradually the "psychopath" has become a subject of cause-and-effect inquiry again. More opinion now favors the view that the PI is a product of environment and structuring influences met in childhood. The "absence of conscience" in the psychopath is only apparent; no person is really free of anxiety about his behavior. The psychopath's conscience is a most savage factor of his personality, but it is *totally unconscious.* He conceals from himself the misery of his damaged self-respect, and the resulting drive to self-destruction (self-punishment?). His bravado and debonnaire attitude even fool psychiatrists into such slang phrases as "the man who has no superego." After all, there is no emotional disorder in which conscience does not play a part.

J.F.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION OF THE JOURNAL OF PASTORAL CARE, published quarterly at Washington, D. C., for October 1, 1954.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher—Council for Clinical Training, Inc., 2 E. 103 St., New York 29, N. Y.; Editor—Rev. Ernest E. Bruder, Saint Elizabeths Hospital, Washington 20, D. C.; Managing Editor—Dr. Luberta M. McCabe, 61 Lexington Ave., Cambridge 38, Mass.; Business Manager—Rev. Frederick C. Kuether, 2 E. 103 St., New York 29, N. Y.

2. The owner is: Council for Clinical Training, Inc., 2 E. 103 St., New York 29, N. Y. There are no stockholders. The Council for Clinical Training is a charitable, non-profitable corporation.

3. There are no known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

FREDERICK C. KUETHER,
Business Manager

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 29th day of October, 1954,

MARY E. SPOFFORD,

Notary Public for the State of New York. Qualified in New York County. No. 31-3793600. Cert. filed with City Reg. N. Y. County. My commission expires March 30, 1955.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME VIII

Articles

Booth, Gotthard. Problems of Authority for Individual Christians: Its Use and Abuse 203–217

Bruder, Ernest E. Some Theological Considerations in Clinical Pastoral Education 135–146

Carpenter, Ralph S. Notes on the Meaning of Acceptance in Pastoral Counseling 16–22

Cassler, Henry H. The Prison Chaplaincy 165–168

Gluckman, Robert M. The Chaplain as a Member of the Diagnostic Clinical Team 84–87

Heller, Melvin S. Psychotherapy and the Prison Chaplain 160–164

Laughlin, Henry P. King David's Anger 147–153

Murphy, Carol R. Toward a Modern View of Man: Suttie, Sullivan, and Rogers 88–92

Musser, Elizabeth W. Theology and the Common Life: A Lay View 8–15

Oates, Wayne E. Counseling by Seminarians 154–159

Reeves, Robert B., Jr. Therapy in Worship 1–7

Salzman, Leon. The Psychology of Regressive Religious Conversion. 61–75

Scharfenberg, Joachim. The Babylonic Captivity of Pastoral Theology 125–134

Stern, George G. Assessing Theological Student Personality Structure 76–83

Stinnette, Charles R., Jr. On the Nature of Gifts and Gift-Giving. 218–222

Weigert, Edith. Interpersonal Factors in Marital Adjustment 195–202

Wise, Carroll A. The Relationship between Clinical Training and Field Work Supervision 189–194

Yon, William. The Pastoral Approach: Detachment or Involvement. 23–29

Editorials

Bruder, Ernest E. Editorial Board Changes 96–97

Bruder, Ernest E. A *Journal* Service 224

Fairbanks, Rollin J. Austin Philip Guiles 30

Fairbanks, Rollin J. Memorial Professorship Chair in Clinical Training 34

Fairbanks, Rollin J. Our Book Reviews 34–35
Fairbanks, Rollin J. Field Work and Clinical Training 223–224
Morris, Robert D. Therapy in Worship 31–34
Shaw, Don C. Being and Doing 93–94
Ward, Archibald F., Jr. Psychiatric Concepts and Pastoral Work .. 94–96

Communications

Edward F. Gallahue Planning Conference in Psychiatry and Religion .. 169–171

Book Reviews and Notices

(The name of the reviewer appears in parentheses.)

Anon. (A Co-founder of Alcoholics Anonymous.) Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions (John Dixon Copp) 112–113

Bailey, Derrick Sherwin. Sponsors at Baptism and Confirmation: An Historical Introduction to Anglican Practice (George W. Barrett) 182–183

Barlow, Walter. God so Loved (F. W. Dillistone) 112–113

Benedict, Agnes E., and Franklin, Adele. The Happy Home: A Guide to Family Living (Charles M. Styron) 120–121

Black, Algernon D. If I Marry Outside My Religion (Rollin J. Fairbanks) 115

Blazer, Alfred. What's Your Problem? (John Dixon Copp) 183–184

Boisen, Anton T. The Exploration of the Inner World (Ina May Greer) 58

Bonnell, John Sutherland. What Are You Living For? (Granger Westberg) 56

Bowen, Howard R. Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (John M. Musser) 50–51

Brauer, Jerald C. Protestantism in America (Philip Humason Steinmetz) 179

Brennan, Niall. The Making of a Moron (Joseph Fletcher) 55

Brown, Robert McAfee. P. T. Forsyth: Prophet for Today (Robert C. Dodds) 115–116

Buber, Martin. Eclipse of God (Malcolm A. Jeeves) 236

Cabot, Hugh, and Kahl, Joseph A. Human Relations: Vol. I, Concepts in Concrete Social Science: Vol. II, Cases in Concrete Social Science (Joseph Fletcher) 41–42

Caprio, Frank S. Marital Infidelity (Charles R. Stinnette, Jr.) 230

Carnegie, Dale. How to Stop Worrying and Start Living (Charles M. Styron) 186

Carrel, Alexis. Reflections on Life (Willard L. Sperry) 181–182

Chessman, Caryl. Cell 2455: Death Row (Joseph Fletcher) 231–232

Cullman, Oscar. Peter: Disciple, Apostle, Martyr (George H. Williams) 178–179

de Forest, Izette. The Leaven of Love (Joseph F. Fletcher) 227–228

de Jesus-Marie, Bruno. Conflict and Light (Ina May Greer) 51

Desmond, Thomas C., Chairman. Enriching the Years: Annual Report of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging (Paul B. Maves) 237

Doniger, Simon (Ed.). Sex and Religion Today (Malcolm A. Jeeves) 234 235

Douglass, Charles H. I Take Thee (Rollin J. Fairbanks) 175-176

Durkheim, Emile. Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Leon Salzman) .. 43–44

Duvall, Evelyn M., and Hill, Reuben. When You Marry (Ernest E. Bruder) 54

Elliot, Grace Loucks, and Bone, Harry. The Sex Life of Youth (Joseph Fletcher) 55–56

Ellul, Jacques. The Presence of the Kingdom (Owen C. Thomas) .. 57

Fallaw, Wesner. Toward Spiritual Security (Archibald F. Ward, Jr.) 174–175

Ferm, Vergilius (Ed.). The American Church of the Protestant Heritage (Richard M. Cameron) 119

Gedat, Gustav-Adolph. They Built for Eternity (Raymond W. Albright) 179–180

Goulooze, William. The Christian Worker's Handbook (Robert Nace) 116

Governor's Study Commission. Report of the Governor's Study Commission on the Deviated Criminal Sex Offender (Henry H. Cassler) 54

Hedley, George. The Superstitions of the Irreligious (Orlo Strunk, Jr.) 180

Henderson, Dorothy. I Live and Move (Elita Davenport Wallace) . 180

Houselander, Caryll. Guilt (Ina May Greer) 56

Howe, Reuel L. Man's Need and God's Action (Samuel H. Miller) . 172–173

Hunter, Archibald M. A Pattern for Life: An Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount (Henry J. Cadbury) 121

Hymes, James L., Jr. Effective Home-School Relations (Randolph Crump Miller) 117

Inge, W. R. The Diary of a Dean (Thomas J. Bigham) 121

JOAD, C. E. M. The Recovery of Belief (Don C. Shaw) 108–109

JOHNSTON, RUBY F. The Development of Negro Religion (John M. Burgess) 237

JUDAH, J. STILLSON, AND ZIEGLER, LESLIE JOAN (EDS.). Index to Religious Periodical Literature (Luberta M. McCabe) 113

JUNG, C. G. Psychology and Alchemy (Ina May Greer) 119–120

KENNEDY, GERALD. With Singleness of Heart (Paul B. Maves) 180–181

KENNEDY, JOSEPH A. Relax and Live (Henry H. Cassler) 118

KENT, DONALD PETERSON. The Refugee Intellectual: The Americanization of the Immigrants of 1933-1941 (Robert Ulich) 114–115

KOMAROVSKY, MIRRA. Women in the Modern World, Their Education and Their Dilemmas (Cynthia C. Wedel) 232–233

LANE, HOMER. Talks to Parents and Teachers (Elizabeth B. Lindemann) 44–46

LEWIS, C. S. Mere Christianity (Owen C. Thomas) 57

LOWRIE, WALTER. Action in the Liturgy, Essential and Unessential (Charles W. F. Smith) 106–107

MACE, DAVID R. Whom God Hath Joined (Ernest E. Bruder) 55

MAEDER, ALPHONSE. Ways to Psychic Health (Ernest E. Bruder) ... 36–38

MAEDER, ALPHONSE. Ways to Psychic Health (Leon Salzman) 38–41

MAY, ROLLO. Man's Search for Himself (D. R. G. Owen) 98–99

MCHUGH, GELOLO. Training for Parenthood (Robert Nace) 231

MEAD, MARGARET (ED.). Cultural Patterns and Technical Change (Joseph F. Fletcher) 239

MELISH, WILLIAM HOWARD. Strength for Struggle, Christian Social Witness in the Crucible of Our Times (J. Frank Schulman) ... 238

MILLER, SAMUEL H. The Life of the Soul (John Dixon Copp) 238

MORENO, J. L. Who Shall Survive (Ina May Greer) 187

MULDER, JACOB D. Psychiatry for Pastors, Students, and Nurses (Wayne E. Oates) 106

NORTHRIDGE, W. L. Psychology and Pastoral Practice (Ernest E. Bruder) 173–174

NUTTIN, JOSEPH. Psychoanalysis and Personality (Leon Salzman) .. 99–101

OUTLER, ALBERT C. Psychotherapy and the Christian Message (Randolph Crump Miller) 225–227

OVERHOLSER, WINFRED. The Psychiatrist and the Law (Greer McClellan Taylor) 104–105

OVERSTREET, HARRY A. The Great Enterprise (Herman Eichorn) 48

PIKE, JAMES A. Beyond Anxiety: The Christian Answer to Fear, Frustration, Guilt, Indecision, Inhibition, Loneliness, Despair (Seward Hiltner) 42–43

PILPEL, HARRIET F., AND ZAVIN, THEODORA. Your Marriage and the Law (James A. Pike) 53–54

PITTENGER, W. NORMAN. Sacraments, Signs and Symbols (Ina May Greer) 57

PITTENGER, W. NORMAN. A Christian View of Sexual Behavior (Joseph F. Fletcher) 229

PLANT, JAMES S. The Envelope (Elizabeth B. Lindemann) 46–47

POLATIN, PHILLIP, AND PHILTINE, ELLEN C. The Well-Adjusted Personality (Herman Eichorn) 234

RALL, HARRIS FRANKLIN. Religion as Salvation (F. W. Dillistone) ..113–114

RAVEN, CHARLES E. Science and Religion (Rollin J. Fairbanks) 237–238

RUNES, DAGOBERT D. The Soviet Impact on Society (Prentiss L. Pemberton) 177

SCHUETTE, WALTER E. The Minister's Personal Guide (Ralph Lazzaro) 117–118

SEELY, CHARLES S. Philosophy and the Ideological Conflict (Samuel H. Miller) 186

SHEED, J. F. (ED.). The Book of the Saviour (Charles W. F. Smith) 118

SHERILL, LEWIS W. The Struggle of the Soul (Elizabeth Willett Musser) 46–47

SHIPPEY, FREDERICK A. Church Work in the City (Bradford Hastings) 111–112

SMITH, ROCKWELL C. Rural Church Administration (Norman L. Foote) 115

SPANN, J. RICHARD (ED.). The Church and Social Responsibility (Joseph Fletcher) 109–110

SPARKS, H. F. D. The Formation of the New Testament (Henry J. Cadbury) 120

SPERRY, WILLARD L. The Ethical Basis of Medical Practice (Thomas J. Bigham) 48–49

STAFFORD, HENRY B. The Intimate Problems of Women (Elizabeth Bonney Burns) 181

STERN, EDITH M., AND ROSS, MABEL. You and Your Aging Parents (Paul B. Maves) 49–50

STERN, KARL. The Pillar of Fire (Ina May Greer) 58

SULLIVAN, DOROTHEA F. (ED.). Readings in Group Work (Otis A. Maxfield) 107–108

SULLIVAN, HARRY STACK. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (Clemens E. Benda) 103–104

SUTTIE, IAN D. The Origins of Love and Hate (Robert A. Preston) .. 51–53

TAYLOR, G. AIKEN. A Sober Faith (Malcolm A. Jeeves) 184–186

THOMPSON, MORTON. Not as a Stranger (William B. Spofford, Jr.) .235–236

THORNE, FREDERICK C. Principles of Personality Counseling (Carroll A. Wise) 53

VAN BUSKIRK, JAMES DALE. Religion, Healing and Health (Ernest E. Bruder) 230–231

VAUGHAN, WAYLAND F. Personal and Social Adjustment (Archibald F. Ward, Jr.) 56

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION. The Chaplain's Manual (James H. Burns) 120

WALSH, CHAD. Campus Gods on Trial (Frederic B. Kellogg) 177–178

WERTHAM, FREDERIC. Seduction of the Innocent (William B. Spofford, Jr.) 232

WHITE, VICTOR. God and the Unconscious (Samuel H. Miller) 101–103

WILLIAMS, ARTHUR. Recreation for the Aging (Paul B. Maves) 181

WOOD, MARGARET MARY. Paths of Loneliness (Ina May Greer) 236

WU, JOHN C. H. The Interior Carmel (John Dixon Copp) 110–111

ZIMMERMAN, CARLE C. The Family of Tomorrow (Charles M. Styron) 119

CURRENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

ANON. "Psychiatry and Spiritual Healing," *Atlantic Monthly,* 1954, Vol. 194, No. 2, 39-43 242

CHODORKOFF, BERNARD. "Adjustment and the Discrepancy between the Perceived and Ideal Self," *Journal of Clinical Psychology,* 1954, Vol. 10, No. 3, 266-268 241

DICKS, RUSSELL. "Mental Illness Is Increasing," *Religion and Health,* 1954, Vol. 3, No. 7, 3-6 240–241

FEY, WILLIAM F. "Acceptance of Self and Others, and Its Relation to Therapy-Readiness," *Journal of Clinical Psychology,* 1954, Vol. 10, No. 3, 269-271 241–242

MURPHY, ROBERT C., JR. "Man without a Conscience," *Northwest Medicine,* 1953, Vol. 52, 27-28 243

VAN DEN BERG, J. H. "Pastoral Care and Psychotherapy," *The Student World,* 1954, Vol. 47, No. 1, 72-89 240

WHALEN, THELMA. "Wives of Alcoholics," *Inventory,* 1954, Vol. 4, No. 1, 13-17, 31-33 242–243